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Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are formed of stationary nodes with stringent resources
(in terms of battery power, processor speed, memory and radio range). They have specific
communication and traffic patterns.
Making sensor networks secure is especially challenging because of the wireless medium
and the fact that WSN is physically unguarded. The compromise of sensor nodes may lead to
the loss of secret information and tampering of the software. Hence, intrusion detection
techniques must be designed to detect at least some of the most dangerous attacks. Further,
these techniques should be lightweight to suit resource constrained nature of WSN.
We focus on proposing lightweight detection techniques for most dangerous attacks such
as masquerade, Sybil, packet dropping, sinkhole, data-forging by an aggregator, exhaustion,
HELLO flood and infusing invalid information. We also propose techniques which add new
nodes securely, allow sensor nodes to send anomalies or information about detected
attacks/attackers to the base station and isolate detected attackers.
MG method for detecting masquerade/Sybil is based on overhearing the communication
of the immediate neighbors. SRP method verifies the number of packets sent and received
from nodes based on their id.

For periodic monitoring type of applications, we propose to detect packet dropping and
sinkhole which estimates the number of packets a node should receive/send from/to its
neighbors. Estimating the number of packets is possible because sensor nodes send data
periodically to the base station using a deterministic traffic pattern. The proposed mechanism
also detects exhaustion and HELLO flood attacks. Our technique (DPDSN) detects packet
dropping paths and detects packet dropping nodes only if there is a need to do so.
We also propose overhearing based technique for detecting data-forging by sensor nodes
and aggregator. Our work in detecting invalid source of information (IASN) is based on
expecting certain kind of data from a certain neighbor.
We analyze the probability of success and overhead of these techniques. These solutions
do not substitute cryptography based techniques which generally provide the first line of
defense. Instead they compliment the first line of defense. These solutions are necessary
because physical capture of a sensor node is easily possible.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 WSN and Intrusion Detection
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) consist of small devices—called sensor
nodes—with RF radio, processor, memory, battery and sensor hardware. One can
precisely and deeply monitor the environment with widespread deployment of these
devices. Sensor nodes are resource-constrained in terms of the radio range, processor
speed, memory size and power. WSN follow specific communication patterns as
discussed in [1]. Apart from this, sensor nodes are generally stationary. The traffic
rate is very low and generally the traffic is periodic as well. There may be long idle
periods during which sensor nodes turn off their radio to save energy consumed by
idle listening. Recharging or replacing batteries is expensive and may not even be
feasible in some situations. Therefore, WSN applications need to be extremely
energy-aware.
WSN is mostly unguarded. Hence, capturing a node physically, altering its code
and getting private information like cryptographic keys is easily possible for an
attacker. Wireless medium is inherently broadcast in nature. This makes them more
vulnerable to attacks. Attacks can disrupt the operation of WSN and can even defeat
the purpose of their deployment. An adversary can launch DoS attacks without much
effort (e.g. even without cracking keys used for cryptography-based solutions). To be
practical for real-life WSN deployments, techniques for detecting attacks should be
lightweight. It is important to find nodes that are posing attacks and isolate them
because physical capture and subsequent loss of secret information is easily possible.
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Masquerade and Sybil are the most dangerous attacks because attacker can hide and
perform other attacks. Data forging can be dangerous because it defeats the purpose
of WSN deployment and can even be harmful (e.g. WSN is deployed for detecting
fire and compromised sensors prevent WSN from reporting fire). Packet-dropping,
sinkhole and exhaustion deplete WSN nodes of energy. Therefore it is important to
design techniques to detect these attacks as well.
The focus of the dissertation is on designing lightweight techniques that can
detect the most dangerous attacks. The proposed techniques should take into account
important WSN characteristics like specific communication patterns, periodic traffic,
aggregation [1], coverage and connectivity [2].
1.2 Related Work
In literature the term intrusion means both intrusion by outsider and insider abuse.
Kumar [3] has categorized intrusions into two types,
•

Misuse or Signature-based detection: Intruder takes advantage of weaknesses
in the system and finds out a way to get in. We can formally define these
attack patterns. These attack patterns are called as signatures. Therefore if new
adversary tries to use known attacks to intrude then he will be caught if his
pattern of attack matches some signature.

•

Anomaly detection: In this type of intrusion detection, normal user behavior is
defined and the intrusion detection system looks for anything that is
anomalous hence suspicious. Anomaly detection assumes that intrusion is a
kind of anomalous activity. If it detects anomalous behavior, it can detect an
intrusion.
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One of the earliest works on intrusion detection is commonly considered to be the
one reported by Anderson [4], which introduced the idea of doing anomaly detection
by creating profiles of normal use and detecting deviations from those profiles. This
idea was later formally presented by Denning [4] in what is considered to be the
seminal paper for modern intrusion detection. For a review of intrusion detection in
wireless ad hoc networks, we refer the reader to the paper by Mishra et al. [6]. Zhang
and Lee [7] proposed architecture for a distributed and cooperative intrusion detection
system for ad hoc networks based on statistical anomaly detection techniques. To
paraphrase from [6] this article does not discuss the actual detection techniques.
Bhargav et al. [8] proposed an intrusion detection and response model to enhance
security in AODV [9].
Marti et al. [10] discussed two techniques that detect compromised nodes that
agree to forward packets but fail to do so. The authors use watchdogs that identify
misbehaving nodes and a pathrater that helps routing protocols avoid these nodes.
When a node forwards a packet, the node’s watchdog verifies that the next node in
the path also forwards the packet. The watchdog does this by listening promiscuously
to the next node’s broadcast transmissions. If the next node does not broadcast the
packet, it is misbehaving and the watchdog detects it. Every time a node fails to
forward a packet, the watchdog increments the failure-tally. If the tally exceeds a
certain threshold, it is determined that the node is misbehaving; this node is then
avoided with the help of the pathrater. The pathrater combines knowledge of
misbehaving nodes with link reliability data to pick the route most likely to be
reliable. Each node maintains a rating for every other node it knows about in the
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network. It calculates a path metric by averaging the node ratings in the path. The
overhead of passive continuous passive listening is formidable for WSNs.
Buchegger et al. [11] proposed a mechanism that detects misbehaving nodes by
means of observations or reports about several types of attacks. This allows nodes to
find routes around misbehaving nodes and to isolate them from the network. Nodes
have a monitor for observations, reputation records for first-hand observations and
trusted second-hand reports, trust records to control trust given to received warnings,
and a path manager to adapt their behavior according to reputation of other nodes.
This approach involves continuous monitoring similar to Marti’s approach and
collecting information about intrusion detections at other places in the network. The
overhead is prohibitive for WSNs.
Michiardi et al. [12] proposed a collaborative reputation mechanism that has a
watchdog component. However, it is complemented by a reputation mechanism that
differentiates between subjective reputation (observations), indirect reputation
(positive reports by others), and functional reputation (task specific behavior). They
are weighted for a combined reputation value used to make decisions about
cooperation with or gradual isolation of a node. This approach involves continuous
monitoring and collecting information about intrusion detections at other places in the
network for specific functions. The overhead is too high for WSNs.
Huang et al. [13] proposed a mechanism that needs separate monitoring nodes,
specifically one monitor per cluster (nodes that are in one-hop range form a cluster).
The approach requires monitors to be active. If there is one monitor per cluster, the
monitor does most of the work. In WSNs, there is a risk that monitor nodes run out of
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energy before the network does or before the network gets partitioned. This
contradicts one of the main goals of prolonging WSN lifetime and keeping WSN
connected as much as possible (since battery replacement is a very costly or
unavailable alternative).
Demirbas et al. [14] present a solution for detecting Sybil attack on WSN. It is
based on received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values. The proposed solution
needs collaboration of one other node apart from the receiver. Authors show that even
though RSSI is time-varying and unreliable and radio transmission is non-isotropic,
using ratio of RSSIs from multiple receivers it is feasible to overcome these
problems.
Ngai et al. [15] present an algorithm for detecting the intruder in a sinkhole attack
on WSN. The algorithm first finds a list of suspected nodes, and then identifies the
intruder in the list through a network flow graph. The algorithm also deals with
cooperative malicious nodes that attempt to hide the real intruder.
Piro et al. [16] show that passively monitoring traffic in the network can detect a
Sybil attacker that uses a number of network ids simultaneously. They show that this
detection can be done by a single node, or that multiple trusted nodes can join to
improve the accuracy of detection. They show that it is possible to differentiate
between a single attacker spoofing many addresses and a group of nodes traveling in
close proximity. The solution is for MANETs.
Watchdog’s weaknesses [6] are that it might not detect a misbehaving node in the
presence of
1. Collisions.
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2. Limited transmission power: A misbehaving node could limit its transmission
power such that the signal is strong enough to be overheard by the previous
node but too weak to be received by the true recipient.
The Local Intrusion Detection System [17] is distributed and uses mobile agents
on each of the nodes of the ad hoc network. A distributed IDS has been proposed [18]
in which each node on the network has an IDS agent running on it. The IDS agents in
the network collaborate to decide when and how the network is being attacked. The
architecture is divided into parts: the mobile IDS agent, which resides on each node in
the network, and the stationary secure database, which contains global signatures of
known misuse attacks and stores patterns of each user’s normal activity in a nonhostile environment [1].
Kachirski and Guha have proposed a distributed intrusion detection system for ad
hoc wireless networks based on mobile agent technology [19]. By efficiently merging
audit data from multiple network sensors, their bandwidth-conscious scheme analyzes
the entire ad hoc wireless network for intrusions at multiple levels, tries to inhibit
intrusion attempts, and provides a lightweight low-overhead mechanism based on the
mobile agent concept [1]. The CONFIDANT protocol [20] detects misbehaving
nodes by means of first-hand and trusted second-hand observations or reports about
several types of attacks and avoids misbehaving nodes.
Yu et al. [48] proposed a lightweight security scheme for detecting selective
forwarding attacks. The detection scheme uses a multi-hop acknowledgement
technique to launch alarms by obtaining responses from intermediate nodes.
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Banerjee et al. [49] propose an ant colony based intrusion detection mechanism
which could also keep track of the intruder trials. The proposed technique could work
in conjunction with the conventional machine learning based intrusion detection
techniques to secure the sensor networks.
Agah et al. [50] proposed a protocol based on game theory which detects the
presence of nodes that agree to forward packets but fail to do so.
Da Siva et al. [51] proposed a simple rule based IDS that detects wormhole,
jamming and data alteration. They use cryptography and do not assume that physical
capture of a node is possible.
1.3 Definitions of Attacks
Masquerade [52] is a type of attack in which one system entity illegitimately
poses as (assumes the identity of) another entity. As paraphrased from [53] the
forging of multiple identities is a Sybil attack [54] on the system.
A subverted sensor node [55] can simply neglect to forward certain or all packets.
An attacker may also drop packets to or from certain victims, such as base stations or
other servers. In a sinkhole attack [1], a malicious node uses the faults in a routing
protocol to attract much traffic from a particular area, thus creating a sinkhole.
An attacker may be able to [55] perform a denial of service attack on the network
by inducing repeated retransmission attempts. Even in the absence of high-rate traffic,
if a node must continually retransmit due to collisions or have to route heavy traffic,
eventually its energy may be exhausted.
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In a HELLO flood attack [1] a malicious node can send, record or replay HELLO
messages with high transmission power. It creates an illusion of being a neighbor to
many nodes in the networks and can confuse the network routing badly.
We define data forging by an aggregator as an attack in which aggregator either
forges the data sent by sensor nodes or the final result.
1.4 WSN Model
We assume that N sensor nodes equipped with isotropic antenna of range r and
sensing radius r, are uniformly distributed in a square area of length W such that they
completely cover the area and remain connected. The base station is placed in one
corner of the square area. Clusterheads aggregate [30] sensor readings from sensors
that are in their communication range and forward a single packet towards the base
station. The aggregated data may be forwarded by sensor nodes or clusterheads.
Clusterheads (also called as aggregators) are normal sensor nodes and the role of
clusterhead is rotated among the nodes. We define iteration as the data gathering
cycle during which each sensor node sends locally sensed data to the clusterhead and
clusterheads forward the aggregated data to the base station. The base station is
resource-rich whereas sensor nodes are resource-constrained. We assume that the
sensor nodes are stationary. PWR denotes the initial battery power (energy) of sensor
nodes.
1.5 Trust Model
We assume that the base station is physically guarded and cannot be
compromised. Every sensor node shares a separate secret key with the base station.
This secret key is used to encrypt the locally detected intrusion information or
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anomalies which are sent to the base station. This secret key can be embedded in a
sensor node, at design time, while it is programmed. Based on the anomalies or
intrusion information from sensors, base station guesses about attacks and can initiate
the appropriate action. This centralized approach is necessary because individual
sensor nodes can be easily compromised. The base station securely informs about the
addition of new nodes to their neighbors. Therefore it is safe to assume that nodes
know their neighbors. Below we discuss the intrusion detection system model.
1.6 Intrusion Detection System Model
If each anomaly or intrusion noticed by a node is reported to the base station then
it incurs an overhead that is proportional to the number of hops it takes a node to
reach the base station. These messages are encrypted using symmetric cryptographic
algorithm. Elimination of nodes that are posing attacks is the most difficult problem
because nodes capable of performing masquerade or Sybil attack can join again with
different id. Elimination messages are broadcast messages and they must be
authenticated. For this purpose, we propose the use of broadcast authentication
protocol, µTESLA [41]. Even the addition of new nodes is announced by the base
station using µTESLA. One way function SHA1 can be used to compute message
authentication code (MAC) of the message that is broadcasted by the base station.
MAC is computed using a key chain that the base station computes. K0 is a
commitment to the key chain and it is safe to assume that all the nodes have this key
K0 from design time. Losing K0 does not affect µTESLA. µTESLA also requires
nodes to be loosely time synchronized.
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1.7 Dissertation Statement
Intrusion detection techniques based on mutual guarding, statistical information
about traffic and existing system information can be used to detect attacks such as
masquerade, Sybil, packet-dropping, sinkhole, exhaustion, HELLO flood and data
forging (by an aggregator) for WSN.
1.8 Contributions of the Dissertation
The main contributions of this dissertation are,
1. Identifying the most dangerous attacks and
2. Designing and evaluating lightweight solutions to detect these attacks.
1.9 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 identifies the most dangerous
attacks by finding their precursors and studying their effects. Chapter 3 discusses the
solutions for detecting masquerade attack. Chapter 4 describes the solutions for
detecting Sybil. Chapter 5 describes solutions to detect packet dropping paths and
nodes. Chapter 6 presents the solutions for detecting sinkhole, exhaustion and
HELLO flood. Chapter 7 discusses solution to detect data forging by an aggregator.
Chapter 8 discusses detection of invalid source of information. Chapter 9 concludes
the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH CHALLENGES IN INTRUSION DETECTION FOR WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS
Abstract
This chapter discusses two issues. First, we discuss characteristics and
vulnerabilities of WSN that necessitate designing intrusion detection (ID) solutions
specialized for WSN. Second, we identify research challenges in ID for WSN. We also
identify a new type of attack on WSN, called phenomenon forging.
2.1 Introduction
Recall from section 1.1 that the first line of WSN defense, attack prevention, is
not sufficient. The second line of defense, attack detection, using intrusion detection
(ID) techniques is necessary. There are many publications (e.g., [21, 22]) about
possible intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for a broader class of ad hoc networks
(AHNs), which includes WSN. But unless the IDSs are based on efficient mechanisms
for detection of a sufficient variety of attacks, we will be far away from practical ID
solutions. To the best of our knowledge, the efficient ID mechanisms for detecting
intrusions other than packet dropping and flooding attacks in AHNs remain to be
investigated. This means that the existing solutions for AHNs do not cover a
sufficiently broad scope of intrusions.
In the next section, we present other reasons why even these IDSs for AHNs, for the
limited set of intrusions, cannot be directly imported for WSN. The most critical
consideration in borrowing ID solutions from other AHNs is that energy resources in
WSN are even more constrained. Energy is an expensive resource for WSN, because
sensor nodes use batteries. Recharging or replacing batteries is expensive and,
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depending on the deployment milieu, may even be impossible. To be practical for use
in WSN, solutions for detecting intrusions should be lightweight.
The next section discusses characteristics and vulnerabilities of WSN that make
general intrusion detection solutions for ad hoc networks infeasible for WSN. Section
2.3 identifies research challenges in the area of ID solutions for WSN. The first
challenge is to identify the most dangerous attacks on WSN. We postulate that due to
the limited WSN resources, ID in a WSN should be limited to only a few types of
attacks—the ones most dangerous for WSN. Then, we outline other research
challenges that indicate the importance of designing lightweight ID mechanisms for
WSN.
2.2 Salient Features, Vulnerabilities and Controls for WSN
WSN can be viewed as a subcategory of wireless ad hoc networks. As such, the
former must share some characteristics with the latter (like the use of the wireless
medium) as well as have some distinguishing features. Salient features, listed below,
make it difficult or impossible to simply import intrusion detection techniques for
WSN from AHNs.
2.2.1 Salient WSN Features vs. Ad Hoc Network Features
The distinct characteristics of WSNin contrast to AHNs include the following:
1. Sensor nodes are more severely resource-constrained than AHNs. Uneven
consumption of energy by sensor nodes is a bigger problem. Partitioning in a
WSN is thus more probable, in effect seriously reducing the useful network
lifetime.
2. Sensor nodes are mostly stationary.
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3. Both the coverage of the area to be monitored by a WSN and the connectivity of
its nodes must be taken into consideration during WSN deployment [2]. This is
not an issue for AHNs in general.
4. Traffic patterns in WSN differ from traffic patterns in AHNs in at least the
following ways:
a) Unlike in AHNs, traffic patterns in WSN can be classified into three different
categories [1]: many-to-one, one-to-many, or local communications. In many-toone communication, many sensor nodes send readings to a base station or an
aggregation point in the network. Typically, data is aggregated on its way to the
base station to reduce the number of messages [1]. In one-to-many
communication, a single node (typically a base station or an aggregator) floods
several sensor nodes with a query or control information. Finally, in local
communication, neighboring nodes send localized messages to discover each
other and coordinate with each other.
b) Traffic in WSN is not as randomly distributed as in AHNs. Since WSN are
deployed to detect and report events to a base station, traffic is event-driven—
which normally makes it bursty or periodic. Different routing protocols [23] and
sleep-wakeup based MAC protocols [24] take into consideration this nature of
WSN traffic.
2.2.2 WSN Vulnerabilities vs. AHN Vulnerabilities
WSNs are more vulnerable to attacks than AHNs due to the following reasons:
1. Sensor nodes are mostly physically unguarded. A capture of a single node by an
attacker can result in a compromise of shared secrets or cryptographic keys.
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2. Sensor nodes are more resource-constrained in terms of their radio range,
processor speed, memory capacity and battery power.
3. DoS attacks can succeed more easily, since sensor nodes are resourceconstrained. Thus, DoS attacks are more dangerous, more easily defying the
purpose of WSN deployment, even without cracking cryptographic keys.
4. Due to specific traffic patterns (as discussed above), use of asymmetric
cryptographic primitives incurs a heavy communication overhead [25]. As a
consequence, asymmetric cryptography—which is orders of magnitude slower
than the symmetric one—is infeasible for data aggregation, considering limited
resources of sensor nodes.
2.2.3 Security Controls in WSN
Most common security controls used in all kinds of networks, AHNs included, are
based on encryption. It is hard to imagine providing security controls for WSN
without cryptographic solutions, but—due to resource limitations in WSN—these
must be lightweight cryptographic solutions. Being lightweight, they will be even less
effective than medium or heavyweight cryptographic solutions available for networks
and AHNs, which are routinely complemented with ID systems.
Since lightweight encryption in WSN will allow even more successful exploits, ID
solutions are even more important in WSN than in AHNs or other networks. At the
same time, ID solutions for WSN are even more difficult to devise due to their severe
resource constraints.
In view of these facts, we postulate to limit intrusion detection in a WSN to only a
few types of attacks most dangerous for the WSN. Details follow.
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2.3 Research Challenges in Lightweight Intrusion Detection for WSN
This section identifies the major challenges in developing lightweight intrusion
detection techniques for WSN.
2.3.1 Finding the Most Dangerous Attacks
Simpler attacks on WSN can be precursors leading to more dangerous ones. Table 1
shows attack precursors for a number of common attacks. Detecting any of the
precursors is a worthwhile goal as any simpler attack may precede more complicated
and sophisticated attacks that are more difficult to detect. Finding precursors and
detecting them as early as possible is also beneficial considering limitations on WSN
resources.
Attacks

Precursors

Masquerades

Packet forging or Sybil attacks

Sybil attacks

Packet forging

Man-in-the-middle

Packet forging and masquerades

attacks
False route requests

Packet forging and attacking routing protocols

Misdirections

Packet forging

Selective forwarding

Packet dropping

Sinkhole

Packet dropping

Table 2.1: Attacks and their precursors.
Major effects of some attacks are briefly enumerated in table 2. Masquerades and
Sybil attacks do not do any direct harm, so they are not included in table 2. It should
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also be noted that to create a sinkhole, adversary attracts traffic towards itself. An
attacker exploits weaknesses in the routing protocol to launch this attack.
Attacks
Physical

capture,

Tampering,

Effects
Jamming, Unavailability

Collisions, Unfairness
Man-in-the-middle,

Packet

dropping, Network partition, Exhaustion

Blackhole, Selective forwarding
Sinkhole, Flooding, False route request, Exhaustion
Misdirection, Wormhole
Selective forwarding

Unavailability, Exhaustion

Table 2.2: Attacks and their major effects.
The following parameters can be used to quantify threats posed by attacks:
1.

An immediate threat vs. a long-term effect: Some attacks may pose immediate

threats to WSN operations whereas some may not. The latter might still be very
harmful in a long term if undetected.
2.

Active vs. passive: Attacks may be active (e.g., packet forging) or passive

(e.g., overhearing by adversary).
3.

Amount of resources used by attackers: Some attacks may need quite

resourceful attackers (e.g., HELLO flood attacks) or more than one attacker (e.g.,
DDoS), whereas others can be mounted even by nodes with just normal resources
(e.g., blackholes).
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4.

WSN participation: Some attacks are possible only if an adversary joins the

WSN prior to attacking it.
It might be hypothesized that a higher priority in detection should be given to
immediate threats, active attacks, attacks that need lesser resources, and attacks that
do not need WSN participation. (As a consequence, attacks that do not pose
immediate threats, passive attacks, attacks that require more resources, and the attacks
that require WSN participation would be detected only as time and resources permit.)
Attacks leading to exhaustion do not pose an immediate threat but if undetected can
decrease the network lifetime considerably. Since they do not pose an immediate
threat, should their detection be done as time and resources permit? The attacks
caused by packet forging lead to more dangerous and sophisticated attacks like manin-the-middle. Attacks caused by packet dropping lead mainly to exhaustion of
energy. But if a malicious node drops packets continuously, then its neighbors might
wrongly conclude that it is dead. This may lead to network partitions.
2.3.2 Identifying Properties that Watchdogs can Monitor
Watchdogs have been proposed mainly for detecting packet dropping attacks [10,
12]. We propose using watchdogs to detect masquerade attacks. It is very important
to identify the minimum amount of data, information and properties that watchdogs
need to monitor to be able to detect a given number of attacks.
By monitoring packets, watchdogs can extract the following information and use it
for attack detection:
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1.

The received signal strength indicator (RSSI) value for the signal, time of

flight for a bi-directional communication, time of transmission or reception for
a packet, or other physical, temporal and spatial properties of the received packet.
2.

Nodes receiving a given packet or at least the network area that receives the

packet.
3.

Application-specific information that can be used to detect intrusions.

Examples are a timestamp or a location of the network area where a query needs
to be performed.
Design of watchdog-based detection mechanisms should consider the following
important issues and criteria:
1.Watchdogs may need to observe a certain minimum number of packets to detect
an attack.
2.Some watchdogs may need continuous monitoring whereas others may need
periodic monitoring. The latter are preferable for resource-constrained WSN
nodes.
3.Watchdogs may monitor the behavior of nodes, paths or clusters. Watchdogs that
can detect attacks by just observing end-to-end behavior of a path are preferable
over watchdogs that need to monitor every single node.
4.Current watchdog-based mechanisms [10] assume that the area in which a signal
can be received is circular, with the transmitting node at the center of the circle. In
practice the area is not circular. Watchdog-based mechanisms should adapt to the
actual shapes of radio ranges.
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5.Some detection techniques may require collaboration among watchdogs [12]. In
such cases, providing a secure channel of communication between watchdogs is
necessary. It is more difficult in the presence of attackers.
6.Collisions and hidden nodes pose problems to watchdog-based mechanisms and
result in a large number of false alarms and misses [10].
2.3.3 Informing the Network about Locally Detected Intrusions
Even though intrusions are detected at nodes running host-based IDSs, informing
either the whole network or a part of the network about the intrusion or quarantining
the misbehaving nodes is a challenge because of the following reasons:
1.It is costly to provide a secure channel of communication for a resourceconstrained WSN. This is the case even with lightweight cryptographic
algorithms having low computational intensity.
2.Capture of a single sensor node results in compromising a shared cryptographic
key. This is much more probable in WSN than in AHNs in general since sensor
nodes are typically physically unguarded.
3.The adversary can eavesdrop on the wireless medium and can extract and misuse
information shared between watchdogs. (Lightweight encryption can help.)
One more question remains open. If a secure communication channel cannot be
provided, how can local ID information be shared among sensor nodes in such a way
that adversary gets either no or only a part of the useful information? (And, in the
latter case, cannot use it to pose any further attacks on the network?)
The number of adversaries present in the area and their locations will have a
significant impact on the solutions.
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2.3.4 Identifying DoS Attacks Specific to WSN
WSNs are especially vulnerable to DoS attacks (e.g. exploiting buffer overflows)
because WSN nodes are resource-constrained. Security primitives based on
cryptography are not sufficient to guard against DoS attacks because some DoS
attacks can defeat the goal of the WSN even without cracking its keys. As an
example, consider phenomenon forging defined below. Apart from that, DoS attacks
can target proposed MAC and routing protocols for WSN.
Phenomenon Forging: Suppose that a WSN is deployed to detect wildfires. Upon
receiving an alert (which may contain a detection of a wildfire and its location), the
response mechanism to extinguish wildfire gears up. An adversary can defeat the goal
of the WSN by fooling many sensors with small “deceptive” fires (depending on the
WSN intelligence, each could be just a lit match). In this way, the adversary can
confuse the WSN with false alarms and exhaust WSN resources as well as the
resources of the response mechanism. If a real wildfire starts after resource
exhaustion, the WSN and the response mechanism might be unable to adequately
respond. We call this attack phenomenon forging. It is specific to WSN, and it can be
launched without cracking cryptographic keys or forging even a single data packet
(the packets are all real – only the phenomenon is not).
2.3.5 Detecting and Identifying Resources Employed by an Adversary
Detecting strength of an attacker is important because it can affect the reaction of
the response mechanism. The resources employed by an adversary can be measured
by:
1. Counting the number of attackers.
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2. Investigating resourcefulness of each attacker.
3. Investigating the way attackers communicate with each other. Well-connected
attackers are more powerful.
Launching some attacks requires more effort. For example, an adversary wishing to
create a sinkhole needs to participate in routing and find a loophole in it. A packetdropping attack requires less effort.
2.3.6 Detection of Capture and Code Tampering
Code tampering is very difficult to prevent without a special hardware (incl. a
processor) and a compiler [27]. WSN nodes are envisioned to become cheaper and
smaller, eventually dust-sized [28]. They will be deployed in millions. To keep the
costs low, it may not be possible to provide special hardware capabilities for such
numerous and small nodes. This makes prevention of tampering difficult.
Since WSN nodes are physically unguarded, a physical capture is easy. Capture of a
node can compromise shared secrets and keys.
2.4 Summary
Results of this chapter are published in [58]. Our contributions to identifying
research challenges in intrusion detection for WSN can be summarized as follows:
1. We identified the specific properties of WSN that separate them from ad hoc
networks and make it difficult to directly import intrusion detection solutions
from ad hoc networks.
2. We proposed techniques to rank threats posed by attacks on WSN. We described
the relationships between attacks and their precursors, and the effects of attacks
on WSN.
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3. We proposed using watchdogs for detection of masquerades and packet dropping
attacks. We identified information that watchdogs can obtain.
4. We indicated the importance of securely informing the whole network or a part
of it about locally detected intrusions.
5. We identified a new type of DoS attack, named phenomenon forging, which is
specific to WSN.
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CHAPTER 3
DETECTION OF MASQUERADE ATTACKS ON WIRELESS SENSOR
NETWORKS
Abstract
We propose two lightweight techniques to detect masquerade attacks on wireless
sensor networks (WSN). Our solutions take into consideration, important WSN
properties like coverage, connectivity, data aggregation and specific communication
patterns. The two proposed techniques complement each other when used
concurrently. The mutual guarding (MG) technique does not work when nodes are
not completely covered by their neighbors or when adversary has shorter
transmission range than that of the sensor nodes. It also does not protect nodes near
the boundary. Another technique based on the number of packets received and
transmitted (SRP) does not have these drawbacks but is more complex. In this
chapter, we present our proposed techniques and analyze their performance in terms
of successful masquerade detection rate and traffic and computational overhead.
3.1 Introduction
Masquerade attacks can be very dangerous because adversaries can launch other
attacks and can still hide and project themselves as legitimate nodes. Therefore,
masquerade detection mechanisms are necessary. To be practical for real-life WSN
deployments, techniques for detecting masquerade attacks should be lightweight.
We consider a setting in which an adversary is added to the network and it
assumes the id of one of the nodes from 1 to N. There is no deterrent to prevent
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adversaries from posing as one of the nodes with id from 1 to N. Adversaries must
follow the MAC protocol being used by nodes in the network.
In the following sections we present our proposed detection strategies, analyze
their performance, draw conclusions and summarize our findings.
3.2 Proposed Detection Techniques
We propose two techniques to detect masquerade attacks in WSN. Both techniques
compliment each other when used concurrently.
3.2.1 MG: Mutual Guarding
As stated earlier, nodes are stationary and new nodes are added securely to the
network. An attacker can assume the id of only the immediate neighbors because
receiving a packet from someone that is not a neighbor is an anomaly. Similarly
receiving a packet with source id same as your own id is also an anomaly. When two
nodes s and d are in communication range, the common area (area with stripes as
shown in figure 3.1) in which the packets sent by both of them can be received is said
to be mutually guarded by them. In figure 3.1, when an adversary A sends a packet to
d by setting source id to s, s also receives the packet. s detects the presence of attacker
that masquerades as itself. Thus the adversary cannot masquerade as s or d without
getting detected when it is located in the common area. Generalizing, when node s
has neighbors around it and if the neighbors’ transmission area overlaps with the
whole area in which node s can transmit then the attacker cannot masquerade as any
neighbor to node s. Receiving a packet sent by A by changing source id to s, is an
anomaly for some node that has never received a packet from s. A node can thus
detect the presence of an attacker that masquerades as s from these observations.

24

s

d

A

Figure 3.1: s overhears A masquerading as s.
The above proposed MG method detects the presence of attackers that have
isotropic antennae with transmission range equal to or greater than that of the sensor
nodes. The transmission area of node s needs to be completely guarded by its
neighbors. WSN deployment takes both coverage and connectivity into account and
hence MG method works for all the internal nodes (because they are completely
guarded by neighbors). Note that if A has a directional antenna or a shorter range to
reach d but not s then it will go undetected even if it is located in the common area.
Our next method called SRP, is more complex but does not have this drawback.
3.2.2 SRP: Verification of the Number of Packets Sent and Received for
Masquerade Detection
As stated earlier, if attacker assumes the id of a node that is not a neighbor, then it
is an anomaly and attacker can be detected easily. Our proposed solution works for
MAC protocols that avoid collisions by guaranteeing exclusive access to the RF
channel at any given time (e.g. TDMA, 802.11 or CSMA/CA [31] with RTS, CTS,
DATA and ACK). Using RF channel random access techniques, adversaries can
masquerade the id of node s by transmitting data in the time slot allocated to s. If
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adversary fails to follow MAC schedule or if collision is detected (for the above
collision avoiding MAC protocols) then it is an anomaly. It indicates the presence of
an attacker. Our proposed technique can now be described in detail as follows:
Let d be a node. Let si denote its ith neighbor for i > 0. The following test is
performed every T iterations. si keeps track of distinct number of packets sent (Ssid) to
d during the time period that lasts for T iterations. Then d broadcasts a single packet
containing the number of packets it received from its neighbors (Rs1d, Rs2d, Rs3d, …).
If Rsid > Ssid then we conclude that there is an adversary (one or more) that
masquerades as si. Note that we assume for simplicity of discussion that the link layer
is reliable which implies that packet losses due to noise, collisions etc. are handled
reliably and a packet sent is received (albeit maybe after retransmits).
Attacker can perform DoS attack on the above solution but it can be detected
easily. If adversary broadcasts a packet that d broadcasts then receivers will receive
two such packets (one from adversary and one from d) in a time period that lasts for T
iterations. This is an anomaly and it can be guessed that adversary is performing DoS
attack on SRP.
3.3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze our proposed strategies in terms of success rate of
detection, overhead and its effect on the network lifetime.
3.3.1 MG Method
We consider different scenarios as explained next.
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3.3.1.1 Two Nodes Guard Each Other
Transmission
area of node A

Transmission area of
node X

A

Y

X

B

Transmission
area of node Y
Transmission area of
node B

Figure 3.2: Two nodes X and Y that are distance r apart have transmission
range of R.
Two nodes X and Y (of communication range R) have discovered that they are
neighbors and hence they can receive packets from each other. An adversary of range
R has to be inside the area occupied by two circles to communicate with either node
(see figure 3.2 where node B is such an adversary). If an adversary sends a packet to
Y with source field set to X from the common area occupied by 2 circles, then X will
receive that packet as well. X can thus detect that someone is trying to masquerade as
him. If adversary is in the common area occupied by two circles then masquerade can
be detected. However note that we cannot detect an adversary (even if it sends from
the common area), if it has a very small range because it can go very close to one
node and send a packet (it is like whispering to someone so that others in the room do
not hear anything. In figure 3.2 node A can be such an adversary). Another node will
not be able to listen in on the transmission and hence will not receive the packet. Let
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d be the distance between X and Y. The common area is 2R2 (cos-1(d/2R) – (d/2R)(1(d/2R)2)0.5). Total area occupied by two circles is 2ΠR2 - 2R2 (cos-1(d/2R) + (d/2R)(1(d/2R)2)0.5). If an adversary chooses the location randomly then the adversary is
equally likely to be anywhere in the area occupied by the two circles. Therefore the
probability of detection is 2R2 (cos-1(d/2R) – (d/2R)(1-(d/2R)2)0.5) / (2ΠR2 - 2R2 (cos1

(d/2R) + (d/2R)(1-(d/2R)2)0.5). Ratio d/R can take values form 0 to 1. Figure 3.3

shows the probability of detection against the ratio d/R. If two nodes are very close to
each other, the probability of detection is very high. Similarly if they are far apart the
probability of detection becomes very low. This also gives insights on how to place
nodes in a WSN. Adversary of range greater than R may go undetected because it can
position itself such that it is able to communicate with only X or Y. In the next
subsection, we show how the above idea can be extended for three nodes.

Probability of Detection for Two Nodes
1

Probability

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

d/R

Figure 3.3: Probability of detection against d/R.
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3.3.1.2 Three Nodes Guard Each Other
If three nodes are in the communication range of each other then they can guard
each other from a masquerade attack better (see figure 3.4). For example if an
adversary tries to send a packet to B by changing the source field to A from an area
AB then A will receive that packet as well and can detect an intrusion. But adversary
can masquerade as C from some part of an area AB. If an adversary sends a packet
from area AB, area BC or area AC, it will be received by at least two nodes. Those
nodes can guard each other. Similar to 2 nodes case, adversary of very small
communication range will go undetected. Sometimes we cannot detect adversary of
range greater than R because it can position itself in such a way that the packets it
sends are received by only one node.
3.3.1.3 Detection of Masquerade Using Triangulation
The techniques discussed above can be extended for 4 nodes. The triangulation
technique for detecting masquerade can be used as shown in figure 3.4. Let R be the
radio range of all the nodes. Suppose node X has discovered that A, B and C are its
neighbors. A, B and C are placed in such a way that the area in which they can
transmit, completely occupy the area in which X can transmit. So if adversary has
range less than or equal to R and it wants to send a packet to X, it must be in the inner
circle.
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Area AB

Area ABC
Area BC

B

Transmission
area of node C

C
A

Area AC
Transmission
area of node B

Transmission
area of node A

Figure 3.4: Three nodes A, B and C.
One or two neighbors of X will receive that packet. A, B and C have neighbor
information and they know that they are not reachable from each other. So if A gets a
packet with source field set to B or C then A will guess that it is a forged packet. If
adversary tries to masquerade as A from area-A then A will receive that packet and
will guess that there is an intrusion and someone is trying to masquerade as him. In
some cases 2 nodes will detect masquerade. If adversary tries to send from area-AC,
node A and C can detect it, similarly for area-BC and area-AB. Total area occupied by
4 nodes is (Π + 33/2)*R2. The area where packets from the adversary will be detected
is ΠR2. Therefore the probability of detection is Π / (Π + 33/2) = 0.3768. Probability of
false positives is 0 and the probability of false negatives=0.6232.
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3.3.1.4 Placement of Nodes
The above idea can be extended for a whole network. If we place nodes in such a
way that the radio range of inner nodes is completely covered by surrounding nodes,
then inner nodes are secured against masquerade attack. The nodes on the boundary
are not entirely covered, so they are not completely guarded. Let N be the number of
nodes. Let ni be the set of neighbors any node i has for 1 ≤ i ≤ N. If node i receives
any packet with source field set to x such that x ∉ ni then node i can drop that packet.
If a node receives a packet with source field set to its own id then it can conclude that
someone is trying to masquerade as him. If any node drops a packet that does not
come from its immediate neighbor then a node can prevent masquerade. If there is a
mechanism to securely inform other nodes about the intrusion then the attempts of
masquerade can be prevented.
Area AC

Area C
Node X at
the center

C

Area BC
A
Area B
B

Area A

Area AB

Figure 3.5: 4 nodes with transmission range R.
3.3.1.5 MG for the Whole Network
Consider sensor nodes deployed (as shown in figure 3.6) in a square area of
length W. This deployment uses the minimum number of nodes to cover the whole
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area. The deployment shown here is similar to the one presented in [2]. We consider
this deployment only for analyzing MG method.
(Nr+1)r=W
r

Figure 3.6: Optimal deployment for coverage and connectivity. Nodes are located at
the center of the circles that are r apart.
The number of nodes in each row is Nr. Then N= Nr2 and W=(Nr +1)r. Therefore Nr
W
=   − 1 . Nodes closest to the border are not completely covered. Hence they will not
r 

always be able to detect an attacker masquerading as their neighbor.
Theorem 3.1: If an attacker has a transmission range at least as large as the deployed
sensor nodes, then for the optimal deployment as shown in figure 3.6 attacker can
assume the ids of approximately 8Nr – 16 nodes when it finds proper place to transmit
from and it can perform masquerade attack on approximately 4Nr – 4 nodes.
Proof: Only the nodes that are closest to the border are not completely covered. In
figure 3.7, adversary A can assume the ids of m, n, or y. x will not be able to detect
this masquerade attack because m, n and y will not receive the packets sent by A.
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m

Border

A
x

y

n

Figure 3.7: x will not detect adversary A masquerading as m, n, or y.
So adversary A can assume the ids of nodes that are 1 or 2 hops away from the border
if it places itself at an appropriate position while performing the masquerade attack.
The number of nodes that are closest to the border is 4Nr – 4 and only these nodes
are vulnerable to the masquerade attack. Inner nodes are completely covered by their
neighbors. The number of nodes that are 2 hops away from the border is 4(Nr – 2) –
4=4Nr –12. The total number of nodes that are not more than 2 hops away from the
border is 8Nr – 16. An adversary can assume the id of any of these nodes while
performing a masquerade attack.■
3.3.2 SRP Method
In order to make it difficult for an adversary to guess the transmission time of a
node, we can easily assume that nodes transmit packets at a random time during their
allotted time slot. Collisions can be detected when a packet with the stronger signal is
received last [32]. With minor modification to the packet structure in figure 3.8
(including source address in the tail), collisions in which the packet with the stronger
signal is received first can also be detected [32]. This increases the collision detection
rate to a theoretical maximum of nearly 100%. But when two packets arrive at exactly
the same time, a collision cannot be detected at all [32].
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Preamble

Header Data

Synch Bytes

CRC Bytes

Figure 3.8: Packet format (Courtesy [32]).
There are two possibilities in this case. (i) Both packets are lost or (ii) One with
stronger signal is received.
An adversary can transmit only in the time slot allocated to the node it is trying to
masquerade as. If it transmits in the time slot that is not allocated to the node it is
masquerading as, then it is an anomaly. An adversary can be easily detected. Let p1 be
the probability with which the packet sent by the adversary overlaps with the packet
sent by the node that the adversary is trying to masquerade as. Let p2 be the
probability with which the adversary sends data packet at the same time as s and
collision is detected at the receiver. Let p3 be the probability with which both packets
are lost provided collision cannot be detected. Let q be the probability with which
adversary guesses that the previous packet was lost at the receiver because of
interference. It can be noted that it is hard to guess this.
Theorem 3.2: The probability with which the adversary successfully masquerades
one packet is p1.(1-p2).(1-p3) + p1(1-p2).p3.q.(1-p1). The probability that the adversary
is detected while masquerading m packets is 1-(p1.(1-p2).(1-p3) + p1(1-p2).p3.q.(1p1))m.
Proof: Adversary successfully masquerades a packet in 2 ways.
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In the first case, an adversary succeeds in masquerading a packet when (i) the packet
sent by the adversary overlaps with the one sent by the original sender, (ii) collision
cannot be detected at the receiver and (iii) an adversary has sent packet with the
stronger signal. In this case receiver recovered a packet with stronger signal and it
was sent by the adversary. Since a collision is not detected, the receiver increments
Rsid. The original sender does not know that instead of its packet the one from the
adversary with stronger signal is accepted. And it increments Ssid. When Rsid= Ssid,
SRP is defeated. Therefore probability with which adversary succeeds is
p1(1-p2)(1-p3)

(1)

Packet overlap

p1

1- p2

p2

Collision cannot be detected
p3
Both packets lost

Collision can be detected

1- p3
One with stronger signal is accepted

Figure 3.9: Probabilities in Lemma 3.2.
In the second case, an adversary successfully masquerades a packet when (i) there
is a packet overlap, (ii) collision cannot be detected, (iii) both packets are lost, (iv)
adversary guesses that both packets are lost and (v) adversary sends next packet such
that it does not overlap with packets from s.
In this case both (one from the adversary and one from original sender) packets are
lost at the receiver and collision could not be detected. Hence original sender does not
know that its packet was lost in a collision and the receiver could not detect the
collision. The original sender increments Ssid. An adversary sends the next packet and
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the receiver increments its Rsid after receiving it. Then Rsid= Ssid, and SRP is defeated.
The probability with which an adversary succeeds is
p1(1-p2).p3.q.(1-p1)

(2)

Thus, the probability with which the adversary succeeds in masquerading a packet is
P= p1.(1-p2).(1-p3) + p1(1-p2).p3.q.(1-p1)

from (1) and (2)

The probability with which the adversary succeeds in masquerading m packets is Pm.
The probability with which adversary is detected while masquerading m packets is 1Pm and the theorem follows.■
For overhead analysis of SRP, we divide the square area into eccentric circular
strips of width R with the base station at the center. This helps us count the
approximate number of hops for clusterheads located in the strip to reach the base
station. Let W=cR for some constant c. We call an area “k-th strip” if all the nodes in
that area are not farther than kR and not closer than (k-1)R for k ≥ 1. So nodes in strip
k are not less than k hops away from the base station. We compute an area of strip k,
Sk, next. From Sk we compute the approximate number of nodes, Nk, and the
approximate number of cluster heads, Ck in strip k. Then we compute the lifetime of
the WSN and the decrease in lifetime due to SRP.
Lemma 3.3: Area of strip k,
Sk =

=

π (2k − 1) R 2
4

for 0<k≤c

(2k − 1) R 2θ
− 2 A1 − 2 A2
2

where θ =

for k > c

 W 
 .
− 2 cos −1 
2
 (k − 1) R 

π
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α  α 
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−W
W
π θ 
A2 = 
+
sin  +  .
.
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 tan π − sin −1  c   tan π − sin −1  c    2
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 k −1 

 

θ, α, A1 and A2 are as shown in figure 3.10(a).

kth strip

Π/4-θ/2

t (0, W)

(W, W)

θ

α
A2

L1
L2

(k-1)R
A1

q
(0, 0)

R

p

Π/4+θ/2
r

A1

(0, W)

A2

Figure 3.10(a): Area divided into c strips; Sk is marked with stripes.
Proof: An area of the sector with radius kR and angle θ is

k 2 R 2θ
. Difference
2

between the areas of sector k and (k-1) gives us the area of the k’th strip for 0<k≤c.
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Sk =

π (2k − 1) R 2

(3)

4

t (0, W)
h=kR cos(α/2)

q
p

R
α

Π/4+θ/2
r
p

(c)

kR

r

A1

(b)

Figure 3.10: (b) Area A1 is shown above; (c) A2 is triangle pqr.
Next we calculate Sk strip for k>c. To calculate Sk we find the area of the track of
width R, radius kR, angle θ with the center and subtract twice the addition of areas A1
and A2.
Next we calculate area A1. By using trigonometry it can be shown that α
W 
W 
−1 
 . To calculate A1, we substract the area of the triangle tpr
 − cos 
kR
(
k
 
 − 1) R 

= cos −1 

from the area of the sector shown in figure 3.10(b). By trigonometry, the height of the
α
α
triangle, h is kRcos  and length (p, r) = 2kRsin   . Hence an area of the triangle
2

2

α
α
k 2 R 2α
tpr=0.5 * h * length (p, r) = k 2 R 2 sin   cos  . An area of the sector =
.
2

2

2

Therefore
A1 =

k 2 R 2α
α  α 
− k 2 R 2 sin   cos 
2
2 2

(4)

We calculate A2 next. To find the area of the triangle above we find the distance
between points p and q and the height of the triangle (shown by dotted line). By
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trigonometry, it can be shown that θ =

π
2
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 .
− 2 cos −1 
 (k − 1) R 
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We find the coordinates of

points p and q. Slope of L1 is tan π − sin −1    . Hence an equation of line L1 is y =
k


tan π








−W
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,0  . Similarly an
 k 
 tan π − sin −1  c   

 
 k   
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For k > c,
Sk =

=

k 2 R 2θ (k − 1) 2 R 2θ
−
– 2A1 – 2A2.
2
2
(2k − 1) R 2θ
− 2 A1 − 2 A2
2

(6)
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It can be shown that θ =

π
2

 W 
 and
− 2 cos −1 
 (k − 1) R 

W 
W 
−1 

 − cos 
 kR 
 (k − 1) R 

α= cos −1 

(7)

Lemma follows from (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7).■
Nodes in the first strip do the maximum work by forwarding the packets from all
the other nodes to the base station. Hence they die first. Therefore the network
K

lifetime is bounded by the lifetime of the nodes in the first strip. Let Gfrom= ∑ C i .i and
i =1

K

Gto= ∑ Ci (πR 2δ − 1). ASRPlife denotes the network lifetime in number of iterations when
i =1

SRP is run after T iterations. Alife denotes original lifetime without SRP. Aggregators
K

in strip 1 receive C1(ΠR2δ -1) packets from other nodes in strip 1 and

∑C

i

packets

i =2

K

from nodes in other strips. They send

∑C

i

packets to the base station. The total

i =1

K

number of sends performed by nodes in strip 1 is T1=C1(ΠR2δ -1) + ∑ C i . Whereas
i =1

K

the total number of receives is R1=C1(ΠR2δ -1) + ∑ C i . Therefore the approximate
i =2

lifetime of the network in iterations= The approximate lifetime in iterations of the
closest nodes, Alife =

N1 .PWR
where N1 is the number of nodes in strip 1.
T1 E s + R1 E r
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Theorem 3.4: ASRPlife =

N 1 .PWR
 C E + C1 (πR 2δ − 1) E r
T1 E s + R1 E r +  1 s

T







when SRP is performed

every T iterations.
Proof: When SRP is used, clusterheads in strip 1 transmit C1 packets to their
neighbors (Rsid values) whereas nodes in strip 1 receive C1(ΠR2δ -1) packets. The
amount of energy consumed by nodes in strip 1 during SRP is C1 E s + C1 (πR 2δ − 1) E r .
Therefore an overhead (or the energy consumed by SRP) of SRP per iteration
is

C1 E s + C1 (πR 2 δ − 1) E r
. Theorem follows.■
T

3.4 Results
To calculate the probability of success of the SRP method, let us assume that
packet size is b bytes and the preamble of the packet is b/10 bytes in size. We say
packets overlap whenever a small fraction of the packet overlaps. p1 is the probability
with which the adversary succeeds in guessing the time at which the original node
may send the packet. Since WSN traffic is low and intermittent, it is safe to assume
that there is quite a bit of idle time during which nodes do not transmit even during
their allocated time slots. Hence it is difficult for an adversary to send a packet at
approximately the time as the original node such that at least some part of packets
overlap at the receiver. Therefore we consider values of p1 from 0 to 0.3 for analysis.
When a collision happens, we assume that it cannot be detected even if only a
fraction of the preambles overlap. p2=1- P(collision cannot be detected) =1- (2*size of
the preamble)/(2b)=1 - 0.1=0.9.
It is very hard for an adversary to guess that (i) the previous packet collided, (ii) a
collision could not be detected at receiver and (iii) both packets were lost. But still we
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give the benefit of doubt to the adversary and assume that the adversary always
succeeds in guessing it i.e. q=1.
For the purpose of analysis we take p2=0.9 [32]. It can be seen from figs. 3.11 and
3.12 that the probability of success is almost 1 when p1 varies from 0.1 to 0.3, p3
varies from 0.1 to 1 and m is 1 or 2. The probability of success increases as m
increase or as p3 increases. It also increases as p1 decreases.
Probabilty of success when m=1

Prob of success
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Figure 3.11: Probability of success when m=1.
Probaility of success when m=2

Prob of success

1
0.9998
0.9996
p1=0.1

0.9994

p1=0.2

0.9992

p1=0.3

0.999
0.9988
0.9986
0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

p3

Figure 3.12: Probability of success when m=2.
We use the following parameters [33] to evaluate the overhead of SRP method.
Packet size=100 bytes
Max packets transmitted by radio/sec=48
Time for radio to transmit a packet=0.02083 sec
Es =138.3112 J
Er =54.9912 J
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RC5 encryption/decryption energy per packet= 0.076 mJ.
Initial node energy=103 J
For N=15676, r=25, W=1000 we calculate an overhead of the SRP technique. In
one iteration data packets from all the nodes reach the base station. The graphs below
displays % decrease in lifetime when SRP is run after different number of iterations.
% Decrease in lifetime when SRP is used
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Figure 3.13: % decrease in lifetime against number of iterations after which SRP is
run.
Network lifetime decreases by 23% when SRP technique is run after every
iteration. The overhead is quite small and reduces the network lifetime by only 1%
when SRP is run every 30 iterations.
Effect of density on lifetime when SRP is used

%Decrease in Lifetime

1.6
1.4

20

1.2
80

1
0.8

40

0.6
60

0.4

80
100

0.2

0.
15
67
7

0.
14
10
9

0.
12
54
1

0.
10
97
4

0.
09
40
6

0.
07
83
8

0.
06
27
1

0.
04
70
3

0.
03
13
5

0.
01
56
8

0

Density (No of nodes/Sq meter)
100

Figure 3.14: % decrease in lifetime for SRP against density of nodes when SRP is
performed every 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 iterations.
Figure 3.14 shows the percentage decrease in network lifetime against density
when SRP is used after 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 iterations. It can be seen that
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increasing density does not increase the network lifetime. This is because all the
nodes are busy during the iteration and they are placed uniformly. Of course if some
data saving scheme, such as sleep – wake up schedules, is used then the overall
network lifetime will increase by increasing density. But the effect of overhead of
SRP on network lifetime will remain the same.
The overhead of the MG technique is negligible since it uses passive listening.
Data packets are not transmitted. When both techniques can be used at the same time
they can cover more scenarios in which attacks can occur.

% of Masquerade Detection

Transmission range and % of Masquerade Detection
100
80
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0
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11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
Range (in m)

Figure 3.15: Effect of transmission range on percentage of detection of
masquerade.

Figure 3.15 shows the effect of the transmission range of nodes on the probability
of detection of masquerade for nodes randomly placed. We placed 100 nodes
randomly in 100mX100m area. We assume that the adversary has the same
transmission range as all the nodes. Every node is equally likely to be masqueraded.
For each node, adversary finds out its neighbors and tries to masquerade as its
neighbor. For each node, we place adversary at 100 random locations from where it
can transmit a message to that node. It tried to attack all the nodes. Figure 3.15 shows
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the percentage of detecting masquerade attack across the network against the
transmission range of nodes. It is obvious that more peers guard each node if
transmission range is greater. Therefore the percentage of detection increases with
increase in transmission range. But a larger transmission range consumes more
energy for transmission. Therefore higher percentage of detection can be achieved at
the cost of more consumption of energy due to larger transmission range. The above
technique also involves the cost of overhearing.
We use ns2 [46] to simulate WSN of 100 nodes in a square area of width 100m.
Nodes have a transmission range of 10m. If masquerade attack is detected by MG
method it costs 1.93 J of energy whereas an iteration of SRP costs 2.48 J of energy.
Energy consumed for Masquerade Detection

Masquerade-SRP

Masquerade-MG
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1.5

2

2.5

3

Joules

Figure 3.16: Energy consumed for masquerade detection.
3.5 Other Possible Approaches
These mechanisms can be implemented at multiple layers of a network stack to detect
masquerade attack.
3.5.1 Using RSSI Value at Physical Layer
The problem of protecting radio interface (like prevention of eavesdropping and
jamming) has been intensively researched for virtually all wireless networks and
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many solutions have been proposed and deployed, such as spread spectrum
communication and frequency hopping [34]. When a node receives a packet, it is
difficult to find out if the packet came from the claimed sender unless explicit
authentication is used. We try to address this problem by using Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI). Recently proposed embedded operating systems like
TinyOS [35] provide functionality to get the RSSI value. For wireless medium,
received signal strength is related to the distance between nodes.
We associate a neighbor with an estimated RSSI value. After deployment when
nodes perform neighbor discovery, they record RSSI value for each neighbor. These
recorded values can be used to detect intrusion afterwards. The packet received with
RSSI value that is not in the range can be flagged. Similarly a sender can also be
flagged for all further communication. Once intrusion is detected, various kinds of
actions (like dropping a packet, flagging a neighbor etc.) can be taken. However in
this chapter we focus only on intrusion detection and hence do not discuss solutions
to handle intrusions. There are many factors like background noise, weather
conditions etc. that can lead this approach to produce higher percentage of false
positives. Therefore this approach should be used in combination with others (such as
the ones proposed later in this chapter).
3.5.2 Techniques at MAC Layer
When scheduling based protocols are used for media access then there is a
specific time slot allocated to each node. If an adversary wants to masquerade as
some node it has to do that in the time slot allocated to that node. If adversary does
not follow this schedule and tries to masquerade as some node at a time when that
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node is not supposed to transmit, then nodes can detect an intrusion if they keep track
of transmission schedule of other nodes. Below we show how this idea works for
TDMA and S-MAC.
3.5.2.1 Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)
TDMA is a digital transmission technology that allows a number of users to
access a single radio-frequency channel without interference by allocating different
time slots to different users within each channel.
T

∆τ

t0
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t4

Figure 3.17(a): TDMA schedule for nodes - clock drift of ∆τ.
T

X
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Y
t1

t2
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Figure 3.17(b): TDMA schedule for nodes - no clock drifts.
Suppose nodes keep track of TDMA schedules of other nodes that they
communicate with. Node X is allocated time slot t0 and node Y is allocated time slot
t2 (see figure 3.17(a)). For simplicity we assume that all time slots are of length τ.
Suppose an adversary tries to send a packet with sender field set to X in time slot t2.
For a node that receives a packet with source field in the packet set to X in a time slot
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that is not allocated to X, is an anomaly. In this way the data used by TDMA protocol
can be used to detect intrusion. If an adversary sends a packet in the time slot t0 by
changing the source field to X then that packet will not be detected. If we assume that
the adversary sends packet randomly in any time slot of length τ (τ =T/n) and there
are n nodes sharing the medium (in n slots), then the probability of detection is (n1)/n. The probability of false negatives is 1/n. If clocks are synchronized, there will
be no false positives. If there is a clock drift of ∆τ, then the probability of false
positives is (∆τ*n)/n*τ = ∆τ/τ. The probability of false negatives is same as the
probability of false positives.
3.5.2.2 S-MAC
Many MAC protocols like S-MAC have been proposed which use sleep/wake-up
schedule for energy conservation (see figure 3.18). If those protocols are in use and
node A receives a packet with source field set to X at a time when node X should be
sleeping, then node A can easily detect that the packet is sent by an adversary. Node
A can detect this intrusion because it is an anomaly. Above we propose anomaly
detection technique for schedule-based MAC protocols. These techniques use the
available data and hence incur very little overhead, which suits resource constrained
nature of WSNs.
Wake-up

Sleep

Wake-up

Duty Cycle

Figure 3.18: S-MAC sleep/wake-up schedule for a node.
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3.5.3 Techniques at Application Layer: Use of Round Trip Time
At application layer, round trip time can be used for intrusion detection for a bidirectional communication. We associate round trip time with a neighbor. If the round
trip time for some neighbor is not in an estimated range, that neighbor can be flagged.
Similar to RSSI technique, there are many factors like background noise, weather
conditions etc. that can lead this approach to produce large number of false positives.
Hence this approach should be used in combination with others.
3.6 Summary
We proposed two lightweight techniques for detecting masquerade attack. Results
of this chapter appear in [40, 57]. Our solutions take into account important WSN
characteristics such as coverage, connectivity, aggregation and communication
patterns. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
1. Both methods are independent and compliment each other in preventing attacks.
2. MG method fails to protect nodes that are one hop away from the border or when
attacker has shorter communication range than sensor nodes. SRP overcomes
these drawbacks at a reasonable cost.
3. MG method incurs insignificant overhead as it uses only passive listening. SRP
decreases network lifetime by only 1% when it is run after 30 iterations. Overhead
of SRP is minimal.
4. The probability of success is very high for SRP.
5. We also propose use of RSSI values, MAC schedules and round trip time for
anomaly detection which leads to the detection of masquerade attack.
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CHAPTER 4
DETECTION OF SYBIL
Abstract
In this chapter we extend two solutions, the MG method and the SRP method,
discussed in chapter 3 to detect the Sybil attack. Proposed methods are independent
and complimentary.
4.1 Introduction
For a Sybil attack we assume that the attacker poses ids from A1 to Ad such that
[A1, Ad] ∈ {1, 2, 3, …, N}. If attacker poses id other than 1 to N then it can be
detected easily [40] because new nodes are added securely and nodes know their
neighbors. Therefore attacker must pose id that is from 1 to N. We consider two cases
for Sybil attack. (i) An attacker disables nodes A1 to Ad and (ii) An attacker does not
disable nodes A1 to Ad.
We extend the two solutions discussed in chapter 3 to detect Sybil attack - (i) MG
method and (ii) SRP method. We discuss MG method next.
4.2 Mutual Guarding (MG) for Sybil Detection
When nodes are static and new nodes are added securely (as explained later), the
presence of the foreign entity can be detected easily. If any node detects the presence
of a node that is not its neighbor, then it suspects that an attacker is present which
may be Sybil or may be posing a masquerade attack (attacker poses only one false id,
hence masquerade is a special case of Sybil). Therefore attacker must assume ids of
only neighbors. Attacker may or may not disable the actual nodes it assumes ids of.
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1. Let us assume that an attacker poses the ids Ai for i≤d (for a constant d) but does
not disable nodes Ai. There are 2 possibilities:
(i) Actual node Ai is in the neighborhood of an attacker and can directly receive
packets from the attacker. In this case, actual node Ai detects the presence of
the Sybil node.
(ii) Actual node Ai is not in the neighborhood of an attacker and cannot directly
receive packets from the attacker. There is at least one neighbor of the attacker
that has not directly received any packet from Ai before. Thus it suspects Sybil
attack upon receipt of a packet from Ai.
2. If attacker disables the actual nodes then it becomes difficult to detect the
presence of the attacker. But still it can be detected in some cases as shown next.
Let us assume that node A1 was compromised physically, its code was altered and
it poses identities of nodes from A1 to Ad. Nodes A2 to Ad are disabled by the
adversary. If any neighbor of nodes A2 to Ad notice that those nodes are disabled
and at the same time some other node can listen to communication from some
node with id such that A2 ≤ id ≤ Ad, then base station suspects Sybil. Base station
sends a query to find if a node is active after receiving messages that some nodes
have been disabled.
Consider sensor nodes deployed (as shown in figure 3.6) in a square area of
length W. This deployment uses the minimum number of nodes to cover the whole
area. The deployment shown here is similar to the one presented in [2]. We consider
this deployment only for analyzing the proposed Sybil detection technique. Let the
number of nodes in each row be Nr. Then N= Nr2 and W=(Nr +1)r. Therefore Nr
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W
=   − 1 . Nodes closest to the border are not completely covered. Hence they will not
r 

always be able to detect an attacker posing as their neighbor.

Ai
Sensor node
Sybil posing ids Ai

Fig 4.1: Actual node overhears its id being assumed by Sybil.
Corollary 4.1: If an attacker has a transmission range at least as long as the deployed
sensor nodes and it does not disable any node, then for the optimal deployment as
shown in figure 3.6, the attacker can assume the ids of approximately 8Nr – 16 nodes
if it finds proper place to transmit from and it can perform Sybil attack on
approximately 4Nr – 4 nodes.
Proof: Theorem 3.1 establishes this result for masquerade attack. It can be extended
for Sybil attack.■
It can be observed that Ο( N ) nodes are vulnerable to Sybil attacks even when the
MG method is used. Below we discuss a distributed mechanism that guarantees that
our solution does not generate a false alarm. The base station initiates the distributed
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mechanism. We assume that the attacker has only as powerful resources as the sensor
nodes.
Let the node A (and it’s another suspected identity A’) be in the k’th strip (please
see figure 3.10(a)). Base station finds two nodes - let us say X in (k-1)’th strip and Y in
(k+1)’th strip. X and Y are such that they can listen to messages sent by A or A’only but
not both. Nodes X and Y can be found as below (see figure 4.2). The node that reports
the presence of Sybil starts a distributed mechanism to find nodes X and Y. It simply
broadcasts a control packet in the neighborhood to find out such nodes. Nodes that
receive packets only from A or A’ reply with another control packet. It may not
always be possible to find such nodes especially if A and A’ are very close to each
other.
Once nodes X and Y are found, nodes A and A’ are asked to transmit packets
continuously for a finite interval of time say t. Note that this will not cause collisions
because of exposed node problem [43]. Let b be the capacity of the antenna in kbps, p
be the packet size in bits. Each of the nodes X and Y should have received at least
1000bt/p packets if the suspected node is not Sybil. If the suspected node is Sybil then
it cannot transmit more than 500bt/p packets to both nodes X and Y. X and Y send the
number of packets received from two identities to the base station which detects
whether the node is Sybil.
MG method does not guard nodes that are located near the border from the Sybil
attack. For randomly placed nodes, even the nodes that are inside may not be
completely covered and are not guarded from the Sybil attack. Our next proposed
solution SRP does not have these drawbacks.
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X
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A
A’
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Figure 4.2: Suspected ids A and A’ tested for Sybil.
4.3 SRP: Verification of the Number of Packets Sent and Received for Sybil
Detection
As stated earlier, if the attacker assumes the id of a node that is not a neighbor,
then it is an anomaly and the attacker can be detected easily. Our proposed technique
can now be described in detail as follows:
Let d be a node. Let si denote its ith neighbor for i > 0. The following test is
performed every T iterations. si keeps track of the distinct number of packets sent
(Ssid) to d during the time period that lasts for T iterations. Then d broadcasts a single
packet containing the number of packets it received from its neighbors (Rs1d, Rs2d,
Rs3d, …). If Rsid > Ssid then si concludes that there is a Sybil node that assumes the id
si. Note that we assume for simplicity of discussion that the link layer is reliable
which implies that packet losses due to noise, collisions etc. are handled reliably and
a packet sent is received (albeit maybe after retransmits).
Attacker can perform a DoS attack on the above solution but it can be detected
easily. If adversary broadcasts the same packet that d broadcasts then receivers will
receive two such packets (one from adversary and one from d) in a time period that
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lasts for T iterations. This is an anomaly and it can be guessed that adversary is
performing DoS attack on SRP.
4.4 Results
We use ns2 [46] to simulate WSN. Simulation parameters are shown in figure 4.3.
We placed 100 nodes randomly in a square area of length W=100m. Nodes have
transmission range of r=10m. Nodes that are in communication range form clusters.
W=100
r=10
N=100
Packet size=100 bytes
Energy to send a packet, Es =1.38 J
Energy to receive a packet, Er =0.549 J
RC5 encryption/decryption energy per packet= 0.076 mJ.
SHA1 One-way function per packet=0.065 mJ.
PWR, Initial node energy=1000 J
Fig 4.3: Simulation parameters.
For verification of Sybil, we give two suspected nodes 0.5 second time to transmit
packets to two nodes. Each of the nodes that perform a test spends maximum of 22 J
of energy. If Sybil attack is detected by MG method it costs 1.93 J of energy whereas
an iteration of SRP costs 2.48 J of energy.
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Figure 4.4: Energy consumed for detecting Sybil attack.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we propose two independent and complimentary solutions to detect
Sybil attack. MG method costs 1.93 J of energy whereas an iteration of SRP costs
2.48 J of energy. Results of this chapter appear in [56].
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CHAPTER 5
DETECTION OF PACKET-DROPPING ATTACKS
Abstract
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on wireless sensor networks (WSN) can deplete
network resources and energy without much effort on the part of an adversary.
Packet-dropping attacks are one category of DoS attacks. Current techniques for
detecting such attacks in ad hoc networks need to monitor every node in the network.
Once they detect malicious nodes that drop packets, a new path has to be found that
does not include them. In this chapter, we propose a solution, to detect packet
dropping, called DPDSN. It identifies paths that drop packets by using alternate
paths which WSN finds earlier during route discovery. Responding to a packetdropping attack incurs no additional cost because one of the alternate paths is
utilized for all subsequent communication. DPDSN does not require monitoring
individual nodes, making it feasible for WSN. We formulate the probability of
success and failure of DPDSN in the presence of malicious nodes that drop packets.
We compare our approach with existing techniques. Our analysis found that the
overhead of DPDSN is at most Ο( N ) for a two-dimensional grid network of N
nodes. We show that the overhead of DPDSN for a WSN with 100 nodes is less than
3% of energy consumed on route discovery when using DSR or Directed Diffusion
routing protocols.

5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we address the problem of detecting packet-dropping attacks in
WSN. Apart from malicious intent; there can be other reasons of packet dropping like
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collisions, buffer overflows, congestion, etc. It is important to find solutions that take
these factors into account, for example, to prevent false alarms.
Existing solutions [10, 12] for detecting packet dropping in ad hoc networks work
by monitoring individual nodes. Sleep-wakeup schedules followed by nodes in a
WSN [24] make continuous monitoring impractical. Also, monitoring individual
nodes is too expensive for WSN.
Our approach, called DPDSN (Detection of Packet-Dropping attacks for wireless
Sensor Networks), uses the observation that alternate routing paths are readily
available in WSNs, which are typically dense. DPDSN monitors paths and detects
whether any node on a path drops packets. Once we detect such an event, we switch
to an alternate path for communication. We always keep an alternate path ready to
minimize the switching delay. The cost of finding an alternate path is minimized by
having it embedded in the route discovery of source-initiated and receiver-initiated
routing protocols such as the ones proposed in [36, 23].
Keeping alternate paths readily available is justified even if packet-dropping
attacks are not detected. First, the alternate paths can be used for load-balancing
transmissions. Second, uneven consumption of energy is a biggest threat to lifetime of
a WSN because it can partition the network. Use of alternate paths for transmission
can protect nodes on the original path from expending all their energy too soon.
DPDSN can be extended to detect individual nodes that drop packets. We do so
only if there is a real need, because finding such nodes is costly for resourceconstrained WSNs.
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5.2 The DPDSN Approach
This section describes the DPDSN approach, including detection of
compromised paths, embedding alternate path discovery in route discovery, overhead
analysis, and discussion of malicious node discovery.

5.2.1 Detection of Compromised Paths
Our detection mechanism uses an alternate path between a source and a
destination. We propose that the process of finding an alternate path be embedded in
the route discovery phase of routing protocols like DSR [36] and Directed Diffusion
[23]. Ideally, the alternate path does not have any node in common with the original
path. We assume that the source and the destination are not malicious or
compromised.
Packet loss can be caused by congestions due to heavy traffic, collisions at link
layer, buffer overflows, etc. In WSNs, congestions and buffer overflows seem
unlikely to happen because of low traffic rates. Reliable MAC protocol rules out
collisions as a reason for packet dropping. Assuming reliable MAC protocol and
assuming low traffic rates, the main possible reason for packet losses in WSN is
malicious non-forwarding or packet dropping by an adversary or compromised nodes.
We focus on this to detect paths that drop packets.
Compromised paths can be detected as follows. Let ns be the number of packets
sent by the source in a given period of time. Using the alternate path found during
route discovery, the source periodically requests the destination to send the number of
packets received, nr. In DPDSN, the source sends query to the destination using an
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alternate path, requesting it to send nr. Algorithm in figure 5.1 outlines the detection
approach for the currently used path.

Detect_compromised_path(s, d)
begin
Get ns, nr.

while (TRUE)
if ns - nr > 0 then
Guess that packets are being dropped by malicious nodes on the
source-to-destination path.

return TRUE
else
return FALSE
Wait till next verification cycle.

end
Figure 5.1: Detection of a packet-dropping path.
The alternate path is used not only to verify whether ns=nr. If we find that packets are
dropped by the original path, it can also be used for all subsequent communication.

5.2.2 Embedding Alternate Path Discovery in Route Discovery
Finding an alternate path during route discovery is a challenging problem and
finding an optimal alternate path is beyond the scope of this chapter. We address the
embedding problem heuristically and show possible approaches for DSR and
Directed Diffusion.
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5.2.2.1 Embedding in DSR
Let us consider an example shown in figure 5.2(a) and figure 5.2(b) for DSR.
Node 1 is the source whereas Node 8 is the destination. Node 1 sends out a route
request packet, which floods the network as shown by broken-line arrows in figure
5.2(a). Node 8 responds by sending route reply packet as shown by single-line arrows
in figure 5.2(b). Double-line arrows in figure 5.2(b) indicate an alternate path that can
be used later to verify the number of actual packets received by the destination. In this
case, Node 8 determines if there is an alternate path to Node 1. The destination node
finds an alternate path that does not have any node in common with the nodes that are
on the original path. Next, we need to discuss the difficulties one may face while
addressing this problem. In some cases it may not be possible to find an alternate
path. For example, in figure 5.2(c), the original path from Node 8 to Node 1 is
through Nodes 5 and 2. The alternate path from Node 8 to Node 1 includes Nodes 4,
5 and 2. In this case, detecting whether packets are dropped on a path from Node 8 to
Node 1 will not work if Node 2 drops packets. Note that even if we detect that Node 2
drops packets, there is no alternative path to use to avoid packet dropping on a path
from Node 1 to Node 8.
There can be cases for which even if there is an alternate path from the destination
to the source, the destination cannot find it from the route request packets it receives.
It happens because some information is lost when intermediate nodes forward a route
request packet after receiving multiple route request packets from different neighbors.
In figure 5.2(a), Node 7 receives route request packets from Nodes 4 and 6 but it
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forwards only one of the packets to Node 8. In general suppose s is the source, d the
destination and j the only neighbor of d. Also, assume that j receives multiple route
request packets from its predecessors. Node j will forward only one route request
packet to d. In this case there is no alternate path from d to s because j is the only
neighbor of d that can forward packets from s to d or d to s. But there may be an
alternate path from j to s. After receiving only one route request packet (of course
from j), node d may ask node j to find an alternate path from j to s, if one exists. If j
receives only one route request packet, then it can ask its predecessor k to find an
alternate path from k to s.
1-2
1

1-2-5

8

2
5
1-3-4-7

1
1-3-4
1

7

1-3-4
3
1-3

1-3-4-6

4

6
1-3-4

Figure 5.2(a): Source (Node 1) floods the network with DSR route request packet.
Node 8 is the destination.
There can be a case in which node d receives multiple route request packets but it
cannot find node-disjoint alternate path to reach s. It may find an alternate path to
reach some intermediate node m.
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Figure 5.2(b): Destination (Node 8) sends route reply packet (single-line arrows).
Destination finds alternate path (double-line arrows).
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Figure 5.2(c): Alternate path from Node 8 to Node 1 does not exist.
Algorithm in figure 5.2(d) outlines a heuristic process of finding an alternate path
when DSR is used for route discovery. A straightforward solution is to perform route
discovery using DSR and mark the edges of the original path. It incurs significant
cost due to flooding. A better heuristic approach would be to keep two route requests
at every node when a node receives multiple route requests. One of the route requests
is used for establishing the path and second one will be used for alternate path. The
algorithm is outlined in figure 5.2(d). Obviously this algorithm is just one approach
and my not result in an efficient alternate path. Finding optimal alternate path is a
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challenging problem as mentioned above. The described algorithm suffices for this
chapter to address packet-dropping attacks for WSNs.

Find_alternate_path(s, d, AP)
begin
// Let N be the number of nodes. Each node stores 2
//route requests. Node j stores its route replies in
//R[j, 0] and R[j, 1]. predecessor[x] is a function that
//defines the set of nodes that can send route request
//to node x. AP is initialized to {d}.

if (d=s) then return.
if (|predecessor [d]|=1) then //No alternate path to s exists.
j= predecessor [d]

else
if(j ∈ R[d, 1])
j= predecessor [d] //note j not in R[d, 0]
AP=AP ∪ {i}
Find_alternate_path(s, d, AP).

end
Figure 5.2(d): A heuristic algorithm to determine alternate path.

5.2.2.2 Embedding in Directed Diffusion
Let us consider the alternate path discovery problem for Directed Diffusion, a
receiver-initiated protocol. In Directed Diffusion, the destination/sink (Node 8) floods
the network in search of some data (called an interest) as shown by broken-line
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arrows in figure 5.3(a). Whenever that message reaches the source (Node 1), it floods
the network back as shown by solid line arrows. Then, the source reinforces only one
path from the source to the sink, which is shown by single-line arrows in figure
5.3(b). This path is used for all future communication. We modify the reinforcement
step similar to the ideas used for DSR to identify an alternate path. The double line
arrows in figure 5.3(b) show an alternate path discovered during reinforcement step.

5.2.3 Analysis of Overhead for Finding Alternate Paths
We analyze the overhead for finding alternate paths for DSR and Directed
Diffusion. Let the cost of sending a packet be Es and the cost of receiving a packet be
Er. Let N be the number of nodes, m be the average number of node neighbors
(neighbor of a node is any other node within its broadcast range). Let p be the length
of the path.

5.2.3.1 Analysis for DSR
For DSR, the approximate cost of route request and route reply is N(Es + mEr)
and p (Es + Er), respectively. The cost of finding an alternate path is p(Es + Er).
Therefore, the ratio of the cost of finding an alternate path to the cost of DSR path
discovery is p(Es + Er) / (N (Es + mEr) + p(Es + Er)).
The overhead ratio is plotted against p and Er/Es in figure 5.4. Er/Es is the ratio of
the energy consumed for receiving a packet to the energy consumed for sending a
packet. We assume N=100 and m=6. The reason for this value of m is as follows. The
maximum coverage and the maximum number of neighbors for each sensor are
provided by beehive configuration, in which there are 6 neighbors per node (except
nodes on the boundary) [37].
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Sending a packet consumes much more energy than receiving it. For MICA2
mote sensors [38], sending a packet consumes 81 mW energy, whereas receiving it
consumes 30 mW energy [39], that is Er/Es is 0.37. To cover the Er/Es range well, we
chose values of Er/Es to be from 0.25 to 0.5 as shown in figure 5.4. Overhead
increases as path length or Er/Es increases. Still it is no higher than 6% for a path of
length 13.
8
2
5
1
7
3
4

6

Figure 5.3(a): Source (Node 1) sends out interest (solid lines). Sink (Node 8) replies
back (broken lines).
8
2
5
1
7
3
4

6

Figure 5.3(b): Source (Node 1) reinforces a path (single-line arrows) to reach sink
(Node 8) and finds alternate path (double-line arrows).

5.2.3.2 Analysis for Directed Diffusion
For Directed Diffusion, the approximate cost of path discovery is 2N(Es + mEr) +
p(Es + Er). The cost of finding an additional path is p(Es + Er). Therefore, the ratio of
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overhead of finding an alternate path to the cost of Directed Diffusion path discovery
is p(Es + Er)/ (2N(Es + mEr) + p(Es + Er)).
The overhead ratio is plotted against p and Er/Es in figure 5.5. We assume N=100
and m=6. For reasons explained above, we again chose values of Er/Es from 0.25 to
0.5 as shown in figure 5.5. Overhead increases as path length or Er/Es increases. Still
it is no higher than 3% for a path of length 13.
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Figure 5.4: Ratio of overhead of DPDSN to DSR path discovery as a function of path
length and Er/Es.
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Figure 5.5: Ratio of overhead of DPDSN to Directed Diffusion route discovery as a
function of path length and Er/Es.
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5.2.4 Probability of Success for DPDSN
DPDSN works when we can correctly determine whether the original path is
dropping packets. DPDSN succeeds whenever an alternate path does not have any
malicious nodes that drop packets. In the following lemma we assume that N nodes
are placed randomly, and M of them are malicious and drop packets.

Lemma 5.1: Assuming that we always find an alternate path, the probability of
N − M  N
 ÷   where N is the number of nodes in
success for DPDSN is 
p
 p
the network, M is the number of malicious nodes that drop packets, and p is
the length of the alternate path.

Proof: Let P(k) be the probability of finding k malicious nodes on a path of length p.
Note that P(0) is the probability of success for DPDSN.
For k ≥ 0 , P(k) = (No. of ways of selecting k malicious nodes) * (No. of ways of
selecting p-k non-malicious nodes) / (No. of ways of selecting p nodes from N nodes)

N
M 
There are   ways of selecting p nodes from N nodes,   ways of selecting k
p
k 
N −M 
 ways of selecting p-k nonmalicious nodes from M malicious nodes and 
p
−
k


malicious nodes from N-M nodes.

 M  N − M   N 
 ÷   for k ≥ 0
Hence, P(k) =  
 k  p − k   p 
The probability P(0) of finding no malicious node on the alternate path is:

N − M  N
 ÷   .■
P(0)= 
p
 p
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Obviously, the probability of failure of DPDSN is 1-P(0).

Detect_compromised_nodes(s, d, V)
begin
// Let s, s+1, s+2, … , d-1, d be the nodes that are
// on the path from source s to destination d.
// V is the set of nodes that drop packets.

if d-s=2 and Detect_compromised_path(s, d)
= TRUE then
V=V ∪ {s+1}

elseif Detect_compromised_path(s, d) = TRUE then
if Detect_compromised_path (s, [s+(d-s)/2]) = TRUE then
Detect_compromised_nodes(s, [s+(d-s)/2], V)
if Detect_compromised_path ([s+(d-s)/2] + 1, d) = TRUE then
Detect_compromised_nodes([s+(d-s)/2] + 1, d, V)
end
Figure 5.6: Algorithm detecting compromised nodes.

5.2.5 Finding a Specific Node Dropping Packets
DPDSN can be used to detect specific nodes that drop packets. Assume, without a
loss of generality, that the nodes on the path from source s to destination d are labeled
s, s+1, s+2, .. ,d-1, d.
We can detect whether packets are being dropped on this path using the
mechanism discussed in section 5.3.2. We describe that algorithm as the procedure

69

Detect_compromised_path (s, d) shown in figure 5.1. It returns TRUE if packet
dropping by a malicious node is detected on the currently used path from s to d.
Let Detect_compromised_nodes(s, d, V) denote a procedure that performs a
binary search for packet-dropping nodes on a path from s to d (figure 5.6). It stores
detected packet-dropping nodes in set V. [x] represents integer portion of a real
number x (the floor function).

5.3 Comparison of DPDSN with Existing Approaches and Results
In this section, we estimate the overhead of other approaches and compare them
with DPDSN. We calculate the overhead in terms of the number of messages sent and
received. We compute the overhead for all the approaches for just the detection of
packet dropping by a path.
The other existing approaches incur separate cost for the response. Response
includes finding alternate path avoiding nodes dropping packets. It is important to
note that for DPDSN the cost for response is included in the cost of bad path
detection. The reason is that the same alternate path can be used later for transmitting
packets.

5.3.1 Analytical Results on DPDSN Overhead
The destination is queried periodically by the source verifying the number of
packets received by the destination. The following lemma considers overhead for one
query period T, that is for a single verification cycle.

Lemma 5.2: For a single verification cycle, the overhead for DPDSN
is Ο( p ) messages for a network of N nodes where p is the path length.
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Proof: Overhead of DPDSN is the cost of establishing an alternate path, and sending
and receiving a query (verifying the number of packets received by the destination)
that uses this path. For any path, one message (from the destination to the source) has
to be sent during the route reply phase and two messages (one from the source to the
destination and another from the destination to the source) have to be sent for
verifying the number of packets received. Every node on the path sends and receives
these 3 messages. Therefore, for a path length of p hops, the cost is 3p send messages
and 3p receive messages. This cost is for a single verification cycle. Hence, the
overhead is Ο( p ) . ■

Corollary: For a single verification cycle, the overhead for DPDSN for a twodimensional grid sensor network of N nodes is Ο( N ) messages where N is
the number of nodes.

Proof: Overhead of DPDSN, for a path length of p hops, is 3p send messages and 3p
receive messages. This cost is for a single verification cycle. For a two-dimensional
grid sensor network of N nodes, maximum value of p can be 2 N . Therefore, the
maximum cost of DPDSN is 6 N send messages and 6 N receive messages. Hence,
the overhead is Ο( N ) . ■

5.3.2 Analysis of DPDSN Overhead for Finding Specific Node Dropping Packets
For a path of length p, determining whether packets are dropped on the path costs
3p send messages and 3p receive messages. Detecting a specific node that drops
packets will cost 6p send messages and 6p receive messages. In the worst case, all
nodes on the path except the source and the destination can be malicious and
detecting them all one after another will cost 3p.logp send messages and 3p.logp
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receive messages. Detecting individual nodes that drop packets incurs significant cost
for WSNs, so Detect_compromised_nodes() should be used only if there is a real
need of such fine detection.

5.3.3 Comparison with Other Approaches
The following analysis uses j as the number of packets sent, and δ as the number
of packet-dropping instances detected in time period T.
For the same time interval and path of length p, Huang and Lee’s approach
[HL03] needs p/2 dedicated monitor nodes placed on a path alternately, such that
each of the p/2 monitors nodes guards the remaining p/2 nodes. The monitors actively
participate in the communication and they have to take into account each and every
message sent in a period of time T for detection of packet dropping. If j messages are
sent in a period of time T, the cost is jp send messages and jp receive messages.
If j messages are sent over a path of length p in a period of time T, Marti’s
approach incurs a cost of jp receive messages.
The approach taken by Buchegger et al. uses Marti’s watchdog mechanism apart
from the trust manager, the reputation system and the path manager. Reporting
detected attack to other watchdogs will cost p send messages and p receive messages.
If δ instances are detected in a period of time T, reporting local detections to other
watchdogs will cost δp send messages and δp receive messages.
The technique proposed by Michiardi et al. also uses Marti’s watchdog
mechanism apart from the distributed cooperative reputation mechanism. Therefore,
the cost is even higher. These kinds of approaches are too expensive to be suitable for
resource-constrained WSNs.
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Figure 5.7 summarizes the costs for different techniques in terms of the number of
massages sent and received for detecting packet dropping over a path of length p in a
time period T.
Techniques for detecting packet-dropping Overhead (in time period T)
attacks
DPDSN

3p send and 3p receive messages

Huang and Lee [13]

jp send and jp receive messages

Marti et al. [10]

jp receive messages.

Buchegger et al . [20]

(jp+ δp) receive and δp send messages

Michiardi et al. [12]

(jp+ δp) receive and δp send messages +
the cost for reputation mechanism

Figure 5.7: Comparison of techniques for detecting packet-dropping.

5.3.4 Experimental Results on DPDSN Overhead
In order to further validate our approach, we wrote a simulation program in C
program to simulate the following communication scenario. The simulated WSN
consisted of 100 nodes that were placed randomly in an area 100m by 100m. Base
station is situated in one corner. The base station is the message source in all cases.
We set the radio range of nodes to 12m because this assures that each node has
approximately 6 neighbors (based on random placement of nodes), which is
beneficial for communication. For MICA2 mote sensors [38], sending a packet
consumes 81 mW energy, whereas receiving a packet consumes 30 mW energy [39].
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We varied the path length from 3 to 13 hops. We randomly selected malicious
nodes. We assumed that only malicious nodes drop packets. The alternate path was
used to verify the number of packets sent over the original path.
Based on the results, we calculated the ratio of overhead of DPDSN to the cost of
discovering path using DSR and Directed Diffusion. Figure 5.8 and figure 5.9 show
the overhead for DSR and Directed Diffusion. We found that the overhead for
DPDSN is proportional to the path length. This observation is consistent with the
analytical results shown in figure 4.7 and Lemma 5.2. This observation is also
validated by figure 5.4 and figure 5.5, which plot the overhead for different values of
Er/Es. The overhead is independent of the number of packets sent in a given period of
time. Figure 5.10 shows the probability of success of DPDSN.
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Figure 5.8: Overhead for DSR.
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Figure 5.10: Probability of success of DPDSN (for a path length 3 to 13 for a network
of 100 nodes in the presence of 1 to 10 percent of packet-dropping nodes).

5.4 Summary
Recent techniques for detection of packet-dropping nodes in ad hoc networks
incur heavy costs and are not suitable for resource-constrained WSNs. DPDSN
detects whether a path is dropping packets. Overhead for a two-dimensional grid of N
nodes is Ο( N ) packets, where N is the number of nodes. The cost is independent of
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the number of packets transmitted and the number of packet-dropping attacks being
detected.
DPDSN incurs no cost for the response following the detection of a packetdropping attack because the alternate path, established during route discovery, is
ready for the response. The cost of finding an alternate path is the overhead paid
during the route discovery, as shown in figure 5.8 and 5.9. We have shown that
DPDSN works for DSR and Directed Diffusion.
Our simulations show that the overhead of DPDSN for a path of length 3 to 13, is
approximately 0.6% to 2.6% of the energy the network consumes on DSR path
discovery if the DSR protocol is used for routing. Similar overhead for Directed
Diffusion is approximately 0.3% to 1.4%.
Results of this chapter appear in [59].
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CHAPTER 6
DETECTION OF SINKHOLE, HELLO FLOOD AND EXHAUSTION
Abstract
Our solutions for detecting sinkhole, exhaustion and HELLO flood are based on
statistical information about the traffic which is periodic and follows specific
communication patterns. Solutions take into consideration important WSN
characteristics like coverage, connectivity, data aggregation and communication
patterns. We analyze the overhead of these techniques.

6.1 Introduction
Sinkhole and exhaustion deplete WSN nodes of energy. We assume that the
attacker captures sensor node and alters its code to pose attacks. Adversary poses a
HELLO flood attack by adding a device with more powerful radio.

6.2 Detection of Sinkhole
Recall from chapter 1 that WSN has specific communication patterns [1]. In most
of the applications, nodes report their observations to the clusterhead which
aggregates the result and forwards it to the base station. When nodes are static, they
know their neighbors and they know that data flows towards the base station. Since
nodes are stationary, they can easily detect when someone tries to attract data in the
opposite direction. Therefore it is very difficult for an attacker to pose the sinkhole
attack as in [15]. Based on our WSN model, it is safe to assume that for a given finite
amount of time, the network topology remains the same i.e., the paths that are used to
forward data remain same.
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We assume that a sensor node is physically compromised and its code has been
altered so that it can pose sinkhole attack. Adversary tries to attract traffic towards
itself when new paths are set up to send data to the base station.
We divide the square area into eccentric strips of width R as shown in figure
3.10(a). Base station is located at (0, W). This helps us count the approximate number
of hops for aggregators located in the strip to reach the base station. Let W=cR for
some constant c. We call an area “k-th strip” if all nodes in that area are not farther
than kR and not closer than (k-1)R for k ≥ 1. So nodes in strip k are not less than k
hops away from the base station. If a node in the kth strip (for k > 2) is a sinkhole then
its predecessor node in strip (k+1) will experience more traffic than normal, whereas
its successor nodes in strip (k-1) will experience less traffic than normal. Also the
base station receives less number of packets per iteration. We use this observation to
detect sinkhole attack. Whenever nodes experience unusual traffic, they report the
suspect to the base station. Based on this, base station detects whether some node is a
sinkhole. Next we formulate the approximate number of packets each clustehead
generates in one iteration. Please recall from lemma 3.3 that the area of strip k,
Sk =

=

where

A1 =

π (2k − 1) R 2

for 0<k≤c
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Let Ci be the number of clusterheads in strip i. Ci =

2Si

πr 2

for 1 ≤ i ≤ K for K= 2 .c .

K

Nodes in strip j receive

∑C

i

packets from nodes in strip j+1. Each cluster in strip j

i = j +1

K

receive approximately (

∑

K

∑C

C i )/Cj packets. Nodes in strip j send

i = j +1

i

packets to

i= j

K

nodes in strip j-1. Each cluster in strip j sends approximately ( ∑ C i )/Cj packets.
i= j

When a node in strip j is a sinkhole, then its successor in strip j-1 receives no packets
or lesser number of packets, even though its predecessor in strip j+1 has sent
K

∑C

i

packets. When such a behavior is observed by predecessor and successor

i = j +1

nodes, then the base station concludes that the node suspected by them is a sinkhole.
We have just established the following result.

Theorem 6.1: Let nodes u, v, and w be in strip k-1, k and k+1 respectively. w has sent
K

∑C

i

packets to v, but u does not receive any packet from v then u guesses that v is a

i = k +1

sinkhole. u sends encrypted message to the base station stating that v is a sinkhole.
Base station verifies this claim by the fact that it received lesser number of packets
than expected from strip k.■
In order to detect sinkhole a node needs the value of k (the strip number in which
it is located) to count the estimated number of packets it should receive from its
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predecessor. The process of computing the value of k at each node can be embedded
in the original path discovery as shown in figure 6.1. The base station broadcasts a
packet with integer value h=1 in the packet. When a node receives multiple packets
with different h values it chooses the packet with minimum value of h. The minimum
value of h is the value of k for the node. It then increments the value of h and
broadcasts a packet (figure 6.1). Eventually all nodes compute its value of k (figure
6.2).
When nodes include location and the strip number in packets, then the base
station can also detect location of node posing sinkhole attack. Base station estimates
K

approximately ( ∑ C i )/Cj packets from the clusterhead in strip j during each iteration.
i= j

The base station can even find the location of sinkhole from the observations of
successor and predecessor nodes. This in turn will help intrusion response
mechanism. However our goal in this chapter is to only detect intrusions.
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Figure 6.1: The h value is displayed for each arrow.
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Figure 6.2: In the end, base station sets up paths with the nodes.

6.3 Detection of Exhaustion
Attackers can induce battery exhaustion in sensor nodes—for example, by
sending a sustained series of useless communications that the targeted nodes will
expend energy processing and may also forward to other nodes [44]. The expected
number of packets from the predecessor depends on the strip in which a node is
K

located. Clusterhead in strip j receives approximately

∑C

i

/ Cj packets from nodes in

i = j +1

strip j+1. When it receives more packets than expected then it guesses that its
neighbor is performing exhaustion attack. It informs the base station about it. Base
K

station expects approximately

∑C

i

packets from nodes in strip j+1. If a node in

i = j +1

K

strip j+1 is performing exhaustion attack then base station receives more than

∑C

i

i = j +1

packets from nodes in strip j+1. Thus base station can verify that a node in strip j is
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indeed performing exhaustion attack. The cost of detection is minimal since nodes
shave to calculate only the statistical information.

6.4 Detection of HELLO Flood
Many protocols require nodes to broadcast a HELLO packets to announce
themselves to their neighbors, and a node receiving such a packet may assume that it
is within radio range of the sender. This assumption may be false: a laptop-class
attacker broadcasting routing or other information with large enough transmission
power could convince every node in the network that the adversary is its neighbor [1].
We assume that nodes send a HELLO packet to discover their neighbors after
deployment. Attacker must send a HELLO packet with id from 1 to N. If it sends
HELLO packet with some other id then it is an anomaly and the presence of an
attacker can be detected easily. We assume that the attacker has transmission range
greater than 2r. We know that attacker assumes id X such that X Є {1, 2, 3, …, N}.
Attacker may or may not disable actual node X.
If attacker does not disable node X, and if node X receives the HELLO packet
with sender id field set to “X” then it notices that an attacker is masquerading its id
and informs about this anomaly to the base station. After receiving HELLO packets,
nodes send the encrypted packet containing the list of ids of nodes that sent HELLO
packets. From these packets base station derives the number of nodes any node can
reach. Assuming uniform placement of nodes, every node should be reachable to no
more than

πr 2 N
W

2

nodes. If any node reaches approximately at least

4πr 2 N
W2

nodes then

there is a possibility that the node is performing the HELLO flood attack. Base station
can detect this anomaly easily and detect the node causing the HELLO flood attack.
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6.5 Detection of Packet-dropping
The mechanism proposed for detecting sinkhole can be used for detecting packet
dropping.

6.6 Results
We use ns2 [46] to simulate WSN. Simulation parameters are shown in figure 6.3.
We placed 100 nodes randomly in a square area of length W=100m. Nodes have
transmission range of r=10m. Nodes that are in communication range form clusters.
We found that for each iteration, a node consumes an average of 1.88 J of energy.
When a base station broadcasts a packet, a node consumes an average of 0.631 J of
energy. When a base station eliminates a node, each node consumes 1.272 J of
energy. The same amount of energy is consumed by every node when base station
adds new node to the network. When a node reports an anomaly, the nodes that
forward this message, each consumes maximum of 1.93 J of energy. The effect on the
network, of reporting anomalies, depends on how far the node is located from the
base station and the number of anomalies detected. In some cases base station uses
multiple anomaly observations to detect an attack.
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W=100
r=10
N=100
Packet size=100 bytes
Energy to send a packet, Es =1.38 J
Energy to receive a packet, Er =0.549 J
RC5 encryption/decryption energy per packet= 0.076 mJ.
SHA1 One-way function per packet=0.065 mJ.
PWR, Initial node energy=1000 J
Fig 6.3: Simulation parameters.
Figure 6.4 shows the average energy a node consumes on various activities, whereas
figure 6.5 shows the maximum energy any node consumes while detecting different
attacks. Figure 6.6 shows the energy consumed for detecting an attack compared to
initial node energy, PWR=1000 J. In case of Sybil, we give two suspected nodes 0.5
second time to transmit packets to two nodes. Each of the nodes that perform a test
consume maximum of 22 J of energy. Detection of sinkhole incurs cost of computing
the strip number k at each node and the cost of sending anomalies by successor and
predecessor of the suspected sinkhole. Exhaustion consumes minimal energy because
it only requires calculating the statistical information about the expected number of
packets.
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Average energy consumed by node
Overhead of computing k
Anomaly reporting
Node addition or elimination
Broadcast by base station
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Fig 6.4: Average energy consumed by node during different activities.
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Fig 6.5: Maximum energy consumed by node while trying to detect different attacks.
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Fig 6.6: Energy consumed for detecting an attack compared to initial energy of nodes,
PWR=1000 Joules.

85

6.7 Summary
We proposed lightweight techniques to detect attacks on WSN such as sinkhole,
exhaustion and HELLO flood. The techniques are based on statistical information
about traffic. The technique proposed for detecting sinkhole also detects packet
dropping. Sinkhole detection technique depends on estimating the number of packets
a node should receive depending upon its location. The solutions to detect attacks
mentioned in this chapter form the second line of defense complimenting the first line
of defense provided by cryptography based security primitives that prevent attacks.
Results in this chapter appear in [56].

86

CHAPTER 7
DETECTION OF DATA FORGING BY CLUSTERHEADS
Abstract
In this chapter we describe mutual guarding based solution to detect data forging
by an aggregator. This mechanism costs minimal overhead because it uses only the
passive listening on the communication.

7.1 Introduction
We assume that the attacking node (a sensor or an aggregator) is physically
compromised and its code is modified to forge data. By data forging we mean
maliciously changing sensed data and reporting it. We are not addressing the issue of
detecting breach of packet integrity here.

7.2 Solution to Detect Data Forging by an Aggregator
There can be two reasons [42] for incorrect data or results:
(i) Misbehaving sensor or aggregator and
(ii) Faulty sensor or aggregator.
We eliminate the possibility of the second case as explained next. Aggregator
announces the id of the faulty sensor and ignores its readings. By doing this it assures
and informs other nodes about its action of ignoring the readings from faulty sensor.
Since the medium is wireless, nodes overhear packets that are not destined to
them. So they can snoop on the communication between their neighbors. We use
overhearing to find anomalies and detect data forging. Nodes use the following to
detect anomalies.
(i) Overheard data packets from other nodes and
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(ii) Overheard results reported by the aggregator.
From anomalies, the nodes guess whether the aggregator is cheating by using the
lightweight analysis module (as shown in figure 7.1). Our approach is different from
Secure Information Aggregation [42]. Nodes use explicit messages to verify the
validity of data in [42], whereas, in our proposed approach, nodes overhear the
communication of their neighbors. This approach incurs very little cost of passive
listening. It does not need explicit transmission of packets.
The lightweight analysis module is different for different functions such as
AVERAGE, MIN, MAX etc. As an example, below we discuss the lightweight
analysis module for calculating AVERAGE of the data sensed by sensor nodes.
Overheard data from
other nodes

Overheard result
from an Aggregator

Lightweight analysis
module

Detect anomalies

Conclude that an aggregator
and/or some node might be
misbehaving/ damaged

Figure 7.1: General idea behind data forging detection technique at a
monitoring node.
Let us assume that there are m > 1 nodes in the cluster and a node can overhear
transmission from mp nodes for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Let R1, R2, R3, …. , Rm be the readings of
sensor nodes 1, 2, 3, …. , m respectively. Let Rmin and Rmax be the minimum and
maximum possible values of the readings. Aggregator ignores sensor nodes with
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readings that are lesser than Rmin and greater than Rmax. Let RA be the result the
aggregator calculates and the node overhears. Let Rmp be the sum of sensor readings
overheard by a node. Then, if

R mp + (1 − p )mR min
m

> RA or RA >

R mp + (1 − p )mR max
m

then, it

is an anomaly and we conclude that an aggregator is cheating. Nodes closest to the
aggregator can overhear the maximum number of nodes and are best suited to do the
job of detecting whether an aggregator is cheating. It is possible that there may not be
even a single node that overhears all the packets sent to the aggregator. Therefore
nodes are not 100% confident about their guess that the aggregator is cheating. Even
though sensor nodes are not 100% confident about their guess, they do not generate
any false alarms. Next we formulate the confidence, nodes have in their guess as a
function of

l
where l is the distance between the clusterhead and the node and r is the
r

communication range as defined earlier. Since nodes are distributed evenly, the
confidence is proportional to the distance of a node from the aggregator.

Theorem

7.1:

A

node

detects

cheating

by

the

clusterhead

with

2 

200 
l
 l  
−1  l 
cos
−
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−
 
   % confidence.
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Proof: Monitoring node can monitor readings from nodes that are located in the
common
Acommon=

area.
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   . Aggregator receives data from sensor nodes

r2 
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 2r  



that are placed in πr 2 area. Therefore the monitoring node has
confidence in its guess. The theorem follows.■
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A common

πr 2

* 100 %

Aggregator
Sensor node
Monitoring node

Fig 7.2: The closer the monitoring node is to the aggregator the more readings it can
overhear.
For example, when

l
=0 and r≠0 then confidence is 100%. Whereas when l=r then
r

confidence is 39%.
When a node overhears data value that is not in the range then they expect
aggregator to announce the id of the faulty or misbehaving sensor node. In this case,
if the aggregator does not inform all the nodes in the cluster about the presence of
faulty or malicious node then nodes assume that the aggregator is cheating. Similarly
when aggregator accepts readings from faulty or misbehaving sensor nodes and other
sensor node notices it then they inform the base station about this anomaly.
If nodes know their location a priori, then two or more nodes can collaborate and
they can monitor the aggregator. Collaboration among nodes that overhear packets
from disjoint sets of nodes increases the probability of detecting misbehaving
aggregator. But there is a cost involved in this approach. The cost is the
communication between collaborating nodes. Finding appropriate monitoring nodes
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is a challenge for the base station and involves overhead. For nodes with isotropic
antennae we need six nodes placed around an aggregator.

7.3 Results
The proposed solution uses only passive listening; hence the overhead of
detection is negligible. The cost of informing an anomaly to the base station is not
included here.
Figure 7.3 shows the relationship between confidence a node has in its guess
about the behavior of the aggregator vs. l/r where l is the distance between the node
and the aggregator and r is the communication range (as defined in WSN model in
section 5.1) of nodes including that of the aggregator.
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Fig 7.3: Confidence in detecting cheating by an aggregator – numerical result of
theorem 7.1.

7.4 Summary
We propose a lightweight overhearing based mechanism to detect data forging by
an aggregator. This mechanism involves minimal overhead of passive listening.
Results of this chapter appear in [56].
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CHAPTER 8
INFORMATION AUTHENTICATION BY DETECTION OF INVALID
SOURCE OF INFORMATION (IASN)
Abstract
We propose lightweight methods to detect invalid source of information for WSN.
The main idea is to reuse the already available system information generated by
routing protocols for detecting anomalies.

8.1 Introduction
We propose the use of forwarding tables generated by routing protocols for
detecting invalid source of information. This detection ensures information
authentication for sensor networks hence we denote it as IASN in the rest of this
chapter. We analyze and extend IASN in this chapter. We show how it works with
routing protocols like DSR [36], DSDV [9] and Directed Diffusion. We then extend it
where a node running IASN keeps track of neighbors that are k hop away for k > 1.
We term high-level data as information. The main purpose of sensor networks is
to sense some environmental variables and send readings periodically to a base
station or send readings whenever someone demands them. Since multiple sensors are
deployed to sense some environmental variables it is expected that they collaborate
among themselves to generate meaningful information (if sensors are deployed to
sense fire in woods, then detection of fire is meaningful information).
IASN detect intrusions that can occur while information is on route from source
to destination. IASN keep track of neighbors and the type of information expected
from them. Upon information arrival it matches the information against the neighbor
and verifies it. If information is not supposed to come from a certain node, it guesses
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that it is an attempt to infuse malicious packets. We show that IASN works with
source initiated, receiver initiated or table driven routing protocols. We tested our
protocol IASN with DSR and DSDV.

8.2 IASN
Next we summarize IASN. Once a path is established by a routing protocol and
nodes know what information to expect from each of the neighbors, they can detect
an anomaly if they receive that information from different neighbor. Suppose node E
of figure 8.1 sends a packet to node A via node B containing sensed temperature
(INFO3) data, then node A expects temperature data from node B and node B expects
temperature data from node E. If nodes A and B receive the temperature data from
any other nodes except nodes B and E, respectively, then they can detect and filter
(drop) forged packets. In general INFOi is meaningful information like an answer (for
example sensed temperature of some area at some particular time) to some query etc.
Let INFO1, INFO2, INFO3, …, INFOp indicate the p informations that a node receives
from neighbors N1, N2, N3, …, Np respectively.
Every node running IASN can maintain an anomaly detection table (ADT)
containing the list of neighbors that may forward some particular information to that
node. IASN protocol then detects and drops forged packets by comparing the
information in the packet and the source of the packet against the entries in the ADT.
Consider the WSN scenario of figure 8.1 in more detail. Suppose nodes G, H, and E
have established paths reaching node A to send INFO1, INFO2, and INFO3
respectively. Node A gets INFO1 from node C, INFO2 from node D and INFO3 from
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B. Node A can maintain an ADT. Now suppose there is an adversary X, which sends a
forged packet containing INFO1 to node A via node D (see figure 8.2).

INFO1

INFO2
C

G

INFO1
INFO2
INFO3

C
D
B

H

A
K
D
B

INFO3

F

J

E

Figure 8.1: ADT for node A. Node A expects INFO1, INFO2 and INFO3 from
neighbors C, D and B, respectively.
If node A gets this packet from node B or D then it can detect that the packet is
forged because it expects INFO1 only from node C. If node A keeps information about
route updates and keeps the ADT consistent with the current routing paths then it can
very easily detect packet spoofing. Note that an adversary X can spoof a packet with
INFO2 via node D. However, if node D also maintains ADT and runs IASN protocol,
then this forged packet can be detected at node D. Figure 8.3 explains that case.
Designers can thus use the system information to detect intrusions.
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Figure 8.2: A detects forged packet from adversary X because it expects
INFO1 only from C.
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H
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Dropped
J
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Figure 8.3: X sends INFO2 to node D, which drops it.
In figure 8.3, nodes G, H, E, F and J have empty ADTs, as they are not receiving
any information. Whereas A, B, C, K and D have some entries in their tables. In this
example, if all nodes run IASN and if we assume that nodes do not masquerade
(detecting masquerade without an explicit node authentication mechanism is a
challenge) then all the forged packets will be detected and dropped. In the previous
example, a node receives INFO of a certain type from a single neighbor. The ADT

95

can be easily extended to accommodate the situations where (i) More than one
neighbors are allowed to forward the same INFO, or (ii) Multiple INFOs are
forwarded by a neighbor. Efficient representation of ADT should be used to optimize
the performance of IASN with respect to time and space requirements.
It is easy to see that the storage overhead of ADT is proportional to the number of
neighbors. ADT can be easily derived and maintained from the underlying data
dissemination mechanisms or the routing protocols. The forwarding-tables or nexthop information of the routing protocols can be used to build the ADT. Furthermore
route-update messages can be used to keep ADT in concurrence with the routing path
changes. Figure 8.4 shows the updated ADT after a H→D path changes from figure
8.3. This method of detecting anomaly intrusions is thus lightweight because it uses
existing routing data.
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INFO1
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F

INFO3

J

E

INFO2

J

INFO2

K

Figure 8.4: ADTs at nodes after change in route form H to A.
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8.3 Constructing ADTs for Source Initiated on Demand ad hoc Routing
Protocols (DSR)
DSR is an on demand routing protocol. It has route request and route reply phases.
Initially a source floods a route request packet as shown in figure 8.5. A route reply is
generated either by the destination or an intermediate node, which contains an
unexpired route to a destination in its route cache [47]. In route reply phase when
packet is coming back to the source, ADTs can be built at all the nodes that are on the
path as shown in figure 8.6. If that route is not needed anymore then a Cancel
message has to be sent by a source to all the nodes on the route to delete ADTs.
Destination
1-2

2

1

1-2-5

8

5
1

1-3-4-7
1-3-4

7

Source
1
1-3-4

4
3

1-3

1-3-4-6

1-3-4

6

Figure 8.5: Node 1 floods route request packet.
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1-2-5-8
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4
3
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Figure 8.6: ADTs built during route reply phase.
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Let the cost of writing one byte into a packet be w, the cost of reading one byte from a
packet be r, the cost of sending a packet be s and the cost of receiving a packet be v.
Let n be the number of nodes, m be the maximum number of neighbors any node has.
Let p be the maximum length of any path. The approximate cost of route request and
route reply is n(w + s + mv) and p(s + v) respectively. Therefore the cost of DSR path
discovery is n(w + s + mv) + p(s + v). The cost of constructing ADTs at the nodes is
pr. Let us assume that q messages are sent once a path is discovered and ADTs are
constructed. The cost of writing source-id in a packet is qpw, whereas the cost of
reading source-id from a packet is qpr. Therefore the cost of checking whether the
information is coming from an intended neighbor is qpr + qpw. The cost of Cancel
message is p(s+v). Therefore the overhead is (qpr + qpw + pr+ p(s + v)). The cost of
message transmission over p hops is qp(s+v). The ratio of overhead to the energy
network consumes on DSR path discovery and transmission of packets using that path
over some time period is (qpr + qpw + pr+ p(s + v)) / (n(w + s + mv) + p(s + v) +
qp(s+v)). To get an idea of the above ratio empirically, consider a practical situation
in which n=q=100, m=6, s=v, r=w and p=10, the ratio is (2010 + 20(s/r)) / (2720(s/r)
+ 100). The cost of sending a packet is much greater compared to reading a byte from
a packet. If we assume s/r to be 100 and all p nodes run IASN, then they can detect
all the forged packets at the cost of 1.4 per cent energy the network consumes on
DSR path discovery and transmission of packets using that path over some time
period.
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8.4 Constructing ADTs for Directed Diffusion
Directed diffusion is a receiver-initiated protocol. In directed diffusion, destination
(sink) floods the network in search of some data (called as “Interest”) as shown by
dotted arrows in figure 8.7. Whenever that message reaches source, it floods the
network back as shown by solid arrows. Then it reinforces only one path to sink,
which is used for all future communication (see figure 8.8).

It is during the

reinforcement phase that we can construct ADTs on nodes that are on the path. A
Cancel message has to be sent in order to wipe out ADTs if that path is no longer
valid. We analyze overhead of IASN similar to DSR. The ratio of overhead to the
energy network consumes on path discovery and transmission of packets using that
path over some time period is (qpr + qpw + pr+ p(s + v)) / (2n(s + mv) + p(s + v) +
qp(s+v)). For n=q=100, m=6, r = w, s=v, p=10 and s/r= 100, the above ratio is 0.011
which is very small. If all p nodes run IASN, then they can detect all the forged
packets at the cost of 1.1 per cent energy the network consumes on path discovery
using directed diffusion and transmission of packets using that path over some time
period.
In DSDV every node maintains a routing table in which all the possible
destinations and the number of hops to it are recorded (see table 8.1). Routing table
updates are done in two ways: full dump and incremental. Full dump carries all the
routing information whereas incremental carries only those updates, which have
happened after the previous full dump. Table 8.2 is the advertised route table by node
4. In that table we can append a field that will tell neighbors what INFO they should
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expect. When a route table is advertised, neighbors can construct their ADT (see
figure 8.10). Thus constructing ADT at nodes running DSDV incurs a very little cost.
Event
Sink
2
8
5
1
7

Source
4
3
6

Figure 8.7: Sink floods interest (dotted arrows). Source replies with gradient
message (solid arrows).
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Figure 8.8: Source reinforces one route. ADTs can be built during
reinforcement of a route.
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8.5 Constructing ADTs for Table Driven Protocol (DSDV)
Event
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Figure 8.9: All nodes maintain routing tables as shown in table 1 for node 4
in DSDV ([9]).
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Figure 8.10: ADTs are built after node 4 advertises.
Destination Next Hop

Metric

Sequence No.

1

2

2

S406_1

2

2

1

S128_2

3

2

2

S564_3

4

4

0

S710_4

5

6

2

S392_5

6

6

1

S076_6

7

6

2

S128_7

8

6

3

S050_8

Table 8.1: Forwarding table of node 4 for the network of figure 8.9 (modified from
[9]).
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Destination Metric Sequence No.
1

2

S406_1

2

1

S128_2

3

2

S564_3

4

0

S710_4

5

2

S392_5

6

1

S076_6

7

2

S128_7

8

3

S050_8

INFO

INFO1

INFO1

Table 8.2: Modified advertised route table of node 4 to construct ADTs (courtesy
[9]).

8.6 Analysis of IASN
Let us consider a path from source 1 to destination N through nodes 2,3, …, N-1 as
shown in figure 8.11.
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N-1

N
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Figure 8.11: A route from 1 to N.
Node 1 is sending information, INFO to node N. Let f be the number of packets
containing INFO sent by the source to node 2. Let gi be the number of packets with
INFO forwarded by an adversary directly to node i or through neighbors of node i
except its predecessor i-1 to node i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N. All g1 packets will be dropped by
source (node 1) because source itself generates INFO. Let mi be the number of
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gN

packets that reach node i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N. m1 is 0 because node 1 is the source of INFO
and it does not accept packets containing INFO from any other node. We assume that
all the packets an adversary sends are destined for the destination, i.e., node N. We
also assume that all the nodes on the path forward packets to their successor, i.e.,
internal nodes do not cheat. For the purpose of this analysis we assume that adversary
only tries to infuse INFO packets into the network. It does not masquerade as any
other node.

Theorem 8.1: If node i runs IASN and no node j < i runs IASN, then the probability
i

of detecting a forged packet at node i is g i / ∑ g j .
j =2

Proof: Out of nodes 2 through i only node i runs IASN. It receives gi packets from its
neighbors except its predecessor. It will detect and drop all those packets, as those are
forged packets sent by adversary. The number of packets that reach node i is
i

mi = f + ∑ g j .Only f valid packets are sent by the source. Therefore the total
j =2

number of malicious packets that reach node i is mi − f . Hence the probability of
i

detecting a forged packet = g i /(mi − f ) = g i / ∑ g j . ▌
j =2

Theorem 8.2: Let Q={X1, X2, … , Xp} be the set of nodes that run IASN such that and
Xj ≤ i-1 and Xi ≠ Xj for i ≠ j and 2 ≤ j ≤ p. Then the probability of detecting a forged
i −1

packet at node i that runs IASN is g i /( g i + ∑ g j ).
j =2
j∉Q
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Proof: Node i will drop gi packets. The number of packets that reach node i is
i −1

mi = f + g i + ∑ g j . Out of these only f valid packets are sent by the source.
j =2
j∉Q

Therefore the total number of malicious packets that reach node i is mi - f. It follows
i −1

that the probability of detecting a forged packet= gi / (mi -f) = g i /( g i + ∑ g j ). ▌
j =2
j∉Q

Lemma 8.3: When all the nodes on the route (except source which does not have to
run IASN) run IASN then the probability of detecting a forged packet is 1.

Proof: This is a special case of theorem 2 with p=N-1 and i=N. Since all nodes j < i
i −1

run IASN,

∑g

j

is 0. The lemma now follows.▌

j=2
j∉Q

Theorem 8.4: Let Q={X1, X2,,…, Xp} for 1 < p ≤ N be the set of nodes that run IASN
on a route from node 1 to node N. Then the probability of detecting a forged packet
N

N

i =2
i∈Q

i =1

destined for node N on the route is ( g 1 + ∑ g i ) / ∑ g i .

Proof: Node 1 will drop g1 packets. Each of the node i that runs IASN will drop gi
N

packets. Therefore the total number of packets dropped is ( g 1 + ∑ g i ). Adversary
i=2
i∈Q

N

sends

∑g

i

packets. The probability of detecting a forged packet on the route from 1

i =1

N

N

i =2
i∈Q

i =1

to N is ( g 1 + ∑ g i ) / ∑ g i . ▌
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8.7 Results
We simulated IASN protocol using ns2 [46]. For our simulations we considered an
area whose boundary is defined as 100m x 100m. We tested IASN with two routing
protocols DSDV and DSR. For each routing protocol we considered two types of
topologies: fixed and random to simulate regular versus irregular (ad hoc) placements
of sensor nodes. This results in four scenarios. In fixed topology 100 nodes are
arranged in a 10 x 10 grid and are uniformly distributed over the area. In random
topology, we placed the nodes randomly in the 100m x 100m area. We varied the
number of nodes that are running IASN protocol. The nodes that run IASN protocol
are selected randomly. This experiment was repeated for 1 to 100 nodes that run
IASN protocol for all four scenarios. For all four scenarios an adversary is in one
corner and a node under attack is in a diagonally opposite corner. The experimental
results show that the number of packets that are detected increases as the number of
nodes that run IASN protocol increased. This was observed for both the routing
protocols DSDV and DSR.
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Figure 8.12: IASN with DSDV.
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Figure 8.13: IASN with DSR.
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Figure 8.14: Probability of detecting a forged packet on a path.
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Figure 8.15: Probability of detecting a forged packet at a destination.
From our analytical analysis we found that the probability of detecting a forged
packet on a path is proportional to the number of nodes that run IASN (figure 8.14
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and theorem 4). The probability of detecting a forged packet at a destination is as
shown in figure 8.15 (theorem 8.2).

8.8 Keeping Multi-hop Information
So far we were associating INFO with immediate neighbor. Let us consider a
scenario where a node runs IASN and it keeps information about 2 predecessors that
are forwarding INFO. In general if a node keeps track of k predecessors that are
forwarding INFO then we call it a k-hop IASN. Figure 8.16 illustrates various
scenarios of multi-hop IASN (i.e. k-hop IASN). We will see later that there is a
tradeoff between k, storage space and number of nodes that run multihop IASN. In
figure 8.16(a) node 5 runs 1-hop IASN and it drops the packets forwarded by
neighbors of node 5 except its predecessor. In figure 8.16(b) node 5 runs 2-hop IASN.
In this case it drops packets forwarded by neighbors of node 5 except its predecessor
(node 4) and packets forwarded by neighbors of node 4 except its predecessor (node
3). In figure 8.16(c) nodes 4 and 5 run 2-hop IASN. In this case they detect spoofed
packets forwarded by neighbors of node 3, 4 and 5 except their predecessors (2, 3 and
4 respectively). Note that even if we run 1-hop IASN at node 5 (and node 4 still runs
2-hop IASN) the same number of packets will be detected. This implies that running
2-hop IASN on successive nodes is same as running 2-hop IASN on the first node
and 1-hop IASN on the second node. Figure 8.16(d) implies that running 2-hop IASN
on alternate nodes is same as running 1-hop IASN on every node. But with this
approach we have to send ids of 2 nodes in a packet. So we double the number of ids
that we send in a packet. We also generate and store ADTs on only half of the nodes
compared to a 1-hop approach. We have to update packet only on alternate nodes

107

instead of every node. The above approach can be easily generalized for k-hops. If
nodes that are k-hop apart run k-hop IASN then it is same as running 1-hop IASN on
all nodes.

Theorem 8.5: If node i runs 2-hop IASN and no node j < i runs IASN or 2-hop
IASN, then the probability of detecting a forged packet at node i is
i

( g i + g i −1 ) / ∑ g j for 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
j =2

Proof: Out of nodes 2 through i only node i runs 2-hop IASN. Node i receives gi
packets from its neighbors except its predecessor node i-1. Node i-1 receives gi-1
packets from its neighbors except its predecessor i-2. Node i will detect and drop (gi +
forged

gi-1)

packets.

The

number

of

packets

received

by

node

i

is

i

f + ∑ g j | 2 ≤ i ≤ N . Out of these packets only f valid packets are sent by the source.
j =2

i

Therefore the number of forged packets that reach node i is

∑g
j =2

i

detection= ( g i + g i −1 ) / ∑ g j . ▌
j =2
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Figure 8.16: Multi-hop IASN.
Legend: √ are neighbors whose packets will be accepted by nodes running IASN and Χ are
neighbors whose packets will be dropped.

8.9 Summary
IASN uses already existing forwarding tables generated by routing protocols for
detecting invalid source of information. We have shown that it can be used for source
initiated routing protocols, table driven routing protocols and data dissemination
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mechanisms like directed diffusion. The probability of detection increases linearly
with the number of nodes running IASN. Running k-hop IASN on nodes that are k
hops apart is same as running IASN on all nodes with 1-hop information. We have
shown that ADTs can be built while discovering routes for source initiated routing
protocols, table driven routing protocols as well as data dissemination mechanisms
like directed diffusion. The storage overhead of ADT is proportional to the number of
neighbors. Approximate overhead of IASN is 1.4 percent of the energy network
consumes on DSR path discovery and transmission of packets using that path
subsequently. Similar overhead is 1.1 percent for directed diffusion. Results of this
chapter appear in [40].
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
We identified challenges in intrusion detection for WSN. We found that
masquerade/Sybil and packet dropping are the precursors for many other dangerous
attacks. Hence high priority should be given in detecting these basic attacks. We
proposed a intrusion detection techniques for detecting most dangerous attacks like
masquerade, Sybil, packet dropping, sinkhole, HELLO flood and data foging by an
aggregator.
MG method for detecting masquerade/Sybil is based on overhearing the
communication of immediate neighbors. This is a novel and fundamental contribution
and can be extended for any wireless network. SRP method verifies the number of
packets sent and received from nodes based on their ids. Both methods are
independent and compliment each other in preventing attacks. MG method fails to
protect nodes that are one hop away from the border or when attacker has shorter
communication range than sensor nodes. SRP overcomes these drawbacks at a
reasonable cost. MG method incurs insignificant overhead as it uses only passive
listening. SRP decreases network lifetime by only 1% when it is run after 30
iterations (cycle during which all nodes send data to the base station). Overhead of
SRP is minimal. The probability of success is very high for SRP.
We propose a technique to detect packet forging and sinkhole which estimates the
number of packets a node should receive/send from/to its neighbors. Estimating the
number of packets is possible because sensor nodes send data periodically to the base
station. The overhead of computing the estimated number of packets at each node is
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6.6 J per node when energy for sending a packet is 1.38 J and the energy for receiving
a packet is 0.549 J. The overhead of detecting sinkhole is 5 J. DPDSN detects packet
dropping paths and detects packet dropping nodes only if there is a need to do so.
DPDSN works best for another type of WSN application – target tracking. We found
that the overhead of DPDSN for a WSN of 100 nodes is approximately 2.6% of the
energy the network consumes on DSR path discovery. Similar overhead for Directed
Diffusion is approximately 1.4%.
We also propose technique based on overhearing for detecting data forging by
sensor nodes and aggregator. Nodes report their observations with certain confidence.
The confidence is more than 90% when the distance between node and the aggregator
is less than 0.15r where r is the radius. Our work on detecting packet spoofing (IASN)
is based on expecting certain kind of data from a neighbor. We embed the process of
mapping neighbors to data in the routing protocol itself. The overhead is
approximately 1.4% of the energy network consumes on DSR path discovery and
transmission of packets using that path subsequently. Similar overhead is 1.1% for
directed diffusion.
We also propose use of µTESLA based mechanism that allows sensor nodes to
send anomalies or information about detected attacks/attackers to the base station.
We propose solutions to detect some of the most important attacks. Our solutions
are localized (mostly overhearing communication in one-hop range, sharing
information with neighbors or using statistical information based). They involve
minimum overhead in terms of communication and hence are lightweight. We take
into consideration important WSN characteristics like coverage, connectivity, data
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aggregation, communication patterns and periodic traffic. We analyze the probability
of success and overhead of these techniques (both analytically and by simulations).
Our solutions do not substitute cryptography based techniques which generally
provide the first line of defense. Instead they compliment the first line of defense.
These solutions are necessary because physical capture of a sensor node is easily
possible.

9.1 Future Work
We identified following issues as a future work:

9.1.1 Trusting Anomalies and Intrusion Claims
A malicious node can send faulty anomaly and intrusion detection information to
the base station. Malicious node can claim that actual legitimate nodes are posing
attacks. Verifying validity of the anomaly and intrusion detection claims is a
challenge. This problem remains unsolved.

9.1.2 Detection of Physical Capture
Detection of physical capture of a sensor node is difficult to detect. Periodic
monitoring of neighbors can be used to detect physical capture. This problem is
challenging and we list it as a future work.

9.1.3 Intrusion Response Mechanisms
In this dissertation we just focused on detecting attacks and intrusions.
Responding to attacks is an important problem and it remains unsolved for WSN,
hence we list it as a future work.
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